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Seventeen years after the Challenger accident, the space shuttle Columbia and its crew 
were only forty miles from Kennedy Space Center when the shuttle exploded during re-entry to 
the Earth’s atmosphere.  The explosion killed all seven astronauts onboard.  NASA, the National 
Aeronautics and Space Administrations immediately jumped into action, declaring a contingency 
and following the Agency Contingency Action Plan for Space Flight Operations.  As a public 
sector organization, one that must report to Congress and the American public, NASA is held to 
different standards than private organizations when it comes to releasing information.  To 
understand how public sector organizations handle crises, the strategies and tactics NASA used 
following Columbia and how closely the agency followed the contingency plan, this study takes 
a look at NASA from an internal perspective using interviews with six people who were NASA 
employees at the time of Columbia and one journalist who covered the story.  Through the 
interviews those who were there and handled the crisis explained that they followed the plan 
very closely, but that the key in having a plan is to allow for flexibility and to make sure 
employees understand how the plan works by holding rehearsals.  Tactics used during Columbia 
included everything from press releases to press conferences, with NASA Web site playing a 
crucial role in the dissemination of information.  NASA chose the strategy of open and honest 
communication following Columbia, which served the agency well, earning it praise from the 
media and the public.  This idea of open and honest, or transparent, communication was crucial 
for NASA as a public sector organization and the organization provides a model for 




                                  CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
  In 1610 German astronomer Johannes Kepler sent a letter to fellow astronomer Galileo 
Galilei.  In it he wrote, “As soon as somebody demonstrates the art of flying, settlers from our 
species of man will not be lacking on the moon and Jupiter.  Given ships or sails adapted to the 
breezes of heaven, there will be those who will not shrink from even that vast expanse” (Space 
Quotes, 2007).  Even in the 1600s people were looking at space as the final destination of 
exploration.  Over three hundred years later humans were finally able to begin the discovery of 
“that vast expanse.”  NASA, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, was vital in 
supplying the technology that finally put man in space and to the moon.  However, NASA has 
faced tragedies in its mission to explore space.  Four tragedies have rocked NASA’s history.  The 
Apollo1, Apollo 13, Challenger and Columbia missions are all considered tragedies in NASA’s 
history with three of the disasters ending in the deaths of all crewmembers on board. 
 Following the tragedies, NASA was forced to utilize crisis communication strategies with 
both its internal and external audiences.  However, its strategies were not always effective.  
Criticized after Apollo 1 and Challenger and praised after Apollo 13 and Columbia, some of 
NASA’s crisis communication strategies proved ineffective or non-existent.   
As a government, or public sector, agency NASA receives funding from Congress and by 
law is required to keep Congress and the American public informed of its actions in order to 
continue its funding (Kauffman, 1999).  NASA faces a different set of challenges than 
organizations in the private sector including reporting to the highest levels of authority, Congress 
and the President.  This study looks at the history of NASA’s tragedies, its crisis communication 
responses after Apollo 1, Apollo 13, Challenger and Columbia and explains the importance of a 




 The purpose of this study is to give a detailed historical description of four of NASA’s 
most severe catastrophes and analyzes its crisis communication strategies before, during and 
after those events.  The study builds upon the work of Kauffman (1997, 1999, 2001, 2005) and 
Martin and Boynton (2005), but will go further in explaining the crisis situations, the strategies 
and tactics NASA used and the implications of the communications decisions made during the 
time of the crises.  It adds to the already strong body of research by providing in-depth 
interviews with key NASA officials, NASA employees and media personnel, giving the subject 
the internal perspective that has been lacking.   
The interviews focus on the crisis communications strategies surrounding the Columbia 
shuttle disaster.  Little research has been done about the Columbia shuttle disaster, with most 
researchers focusing on the Challenger disaster.  This study will add to the body of research on 
NASA’s crisis strategies giving particular focus to Columbia through interviews and a critical 
analysis of NASA’s Agency Contingency Plan for Space Flight Operations.  The interviews 
communicate a stronger understanding of NASA’s preparations for possible disasters, how 
officials handled the situation during the exact time of the crisis, what the officials thought could 
have been done better and what changes may be made in the future to better handle crisis 
situations.  Unlike previous research, using interviews with key NASA officials will give a better 
understanding of the agency from an internal perspective and will give other public relations and 
crisis communications specialists a look inside a public agency that has dealt with a crisis 
situation.  Through the interviews this study seeks to understand how NASA was better able to 
handle the Columbia shuttle disaster based on lessons learned during and after the three previous 
disasters.  The study also adds to the research surrounding communication in the public sector, 




illuminates that crisis communication plans are vital to the extended well being of an 
organization and it illustrates how other public sector organizations can learn from NASA’s 




CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 
Brief History of NASA 
  Congress and President Eisenhower, as an additional means of national defense, created 
the National Aeronautic and Space Administration (NASA) on October 1, 1958, which absorbed 
the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics.  Following World War II the United States 
and Russia engaged in the Cold War and both countries struggled for dominance in space 
exploration.  When the Soviets launched the world’s first artificial satellite, Sputnik 1 on October 
4, 1957, the United States quickly realized the need for a federal agency capable of researching 
and exploring space.  In response the United States launched Explorer 1, its first Earth satellite 
on January 31, 1958.  In the late 1950s and early 1960s the United States began to send similar 
satellites to the Moon and other planets.  
 In the early 1960s NASA began experimenting with the idea of sending humans into 
space.  Alan B. Shepard Jr. became the first American in space after riding in a Mercury capsule 
during a 15-minute suborbital flight on May 5, 1961.  On February 20, 1962, John H. Glenn Jr. 
became the first American to orbit the Earth.  NASA used Mercury’s successes to create Project 
Gemini, which helped NASA scientists and engineers further understand weightlessness, proper 
reentry and splashdown procedures and “rendezvous and docking in space” (Garber & Lanius, 
2005).  Following Mercury and Gemini NASA launched Project Apollo on May 25, 1961 after 
President John F. Kennedy announced, “I believe that this nation should commit itself to 
achieving the goal, before this decade is out, of landing a man on the Moon and returning him 
safely to Earth” essentially challenging the Soviet Union in a race to the moon (Garber & Lanius, 
2005). 




billion making his dream a reality.  After the success of Apollo 7 and Apollo 8, Apollo 11 landed 
on the Moon on July 20, 1969.  Astronauts Neil A. Armstrong and Edwin E. “Buzz” Aldrin, Jr. 
became the first humans to stand on the moon and Armstrong uttered his now famous words, 
“That’s one small step for [a] man, one giant leap for mankind” (Garber & Lanius, 2005).  
Following years of hostility between the two countries, in 1975 the United States and the Soviet 
Union launched the Apollo-Soyuz Test Project, the first international spaceflight.  In 1981 
NASA used its first Space Shuttle, which could be launched vertically, but land horizontally like 
an airplane.  Two years later Sally K. Ride became the first American woman in space. 
 Other NASA activities included maintaining a permanent human presence in space.  
Congress gave NASA authorization in 1984 to build a space station.  After a number of 
redesigns, Russia teamed with the United States and other countries in 1993 to build the 
International Space Station with permanent habitation beginning on November 2, 2000.  NASA 
has also sent many probes into space to explore the Moon, planets and far-reaching areas of the 
solar system.  The most famous of the probes, the Hubble Space Telescope, launched in 1990 
and orbited the Earth.  NASA also sent an orbiter to Mars to gather information on the red planet, 
however the orbiter disappeared into space.  The Mars Global Surveyor was launched on 
November 7, 1996 and continues to map Mars today.  NASA also landed the Mars Pathfinder 
and its miniature rover, Sojourner, on Mars on July 4, 1997.  President George W. Bush 
announced on January 14, 2004 a new Vision for Space Exploration.  The new plan includes 
sending astronauts back to the Moon and landing them on Mars.  The plan also proposes retiring 
the space shuttle and developing a new craft named the Crew Exploration Vehicle (Garber & 
Lanius, 2005). Missing from this brief history is any mention of the four largest disasters faced 





Effective Crisis Communication 
  All organizations will more than likely face some kind of crisis in their history.  Although 
a difficult time for an organization some view a crisis as simply one stage in an organization’s 
lifecycle.  Weick (1995) said that what is important is not the actual crisis, but how an 
organization deals with the crisis.  Effective crisis communication plans can have a large impact 
on how successfully an organization can handle a crisis.  Without a crisis communication plan in 
place organizations have to scramble to find ways to communicate with both internal and 
external audiences.  The way an organization handles a crisis can also have a large impact on its 
image.   
  Fearn-Banks (2007) identifies three possible outcomes for organizations in crisis.  The 
first and most severe outcome includes legal ramifications for both the organization and its 
leaders and often results in the organization going out of business.  A less severe outcome is 
when an organization continues to exist, but loses credibility with its publics, which, in turn, may 
cause financial difficulties for the organization in the future.  The outcome every organization 
hopes for is to come out of a crisis situation as favorable or more favorable with its publics as it 
was before the crisis.   
There is an increasing amount of literature on crisis communication and image 
restoration.  Before further discussing crisis communication it is important to understand what 
past researchers have defined as a crisis.  Hermann (1972) defines a crisis as “a situation that 
threatens high-priority goals of the decision-making unit, restricts the amount of time available 
for response before the decision is transformed and surprises the members of the decision-




major occurrence with a potentially negative outcome affecting the organization, company, or 
industry, as well as its publics, products, services, or good name,” causing interruptions in 
business and threats to the organizations very existence (p. 8).  Fearn-Banks (2007) also lists the 
five steps of a crisis: detection, prevention/preparation, containment, recovery and learning.  
Coombs (2004) identifies crises as “sudden and negative” (p. 267).  Finally, Schannon (2006) 
writes that a crisis can be defined as “A cascading, ongoing trauma that significantly and 
dramatically violates the trust between an organization and its audiences” (p. 15).  These 
definitions of crises should be remembered when discussing organizational crisis, crisis 
communication and crisis communication strategies.  Coombs (1995) breaks crises into 
unintentional and intentional crises and then into internal and external crises.  This created a 
matrix of four types of crisis: accidents (unintentional and internal), transgressions (intentional 
and internal), faux pas (unintentional and external) and terrorism (intentional and external). 
 Pearson and Mitroff (1993) define organizational crisis as an incident or event that poses 
a threat to the organization’s reputation and viability.  They composed five dimensions of crises 
including: that they are highly visible, require immediate attention, contain an element of 
surprise, have a need for action and are outside the organization’s complete control.  Other 
researchers have also defined crisis communication in similar terms (Coombs, 1998; Barton, 
2001; Benoit, 1995).  Four elements can be used to determine how much of a threat the crisis 
will be to an organization.  The four elements are crisis type, severity of damage, crisis history 
and relationship history (Coombs, 2006).  Coombs and Holladay (1996) developed three options 
or strategies that an organization in crisis could utilize.  The first is to establish that there is no 




stakeholders.  The third strategy is to alter the perception stakeholders have of the crisis and 
work to protect and repair the organization’s reputation. 
  Fearn-Banks (2007) identifies crisis communication as “the dialogue between the 
organization and its public prior to, during and after the negative occurrence” (p. 9).  The 
dialogue includes communication that will “minimize damage to the image of the organization” 
(p. 9).  Huang, Lin and Su (2005) defined crisis communication strategies as “the actual verbal 
and nonverbal responses an organization uses to address a crisis” (p. 231).  Coombs (1998) 
developed a continuum of crisis communication responses and arranged the seven crisis 
communication strategies on a continuum in order from defensive to accommodative.  The crisis 
communication strategies include: attack the consumer by aggressively denying claims of a crisis 
and punish the accuser; denial claims there is no crisis or that the organization is uninvolved in 
the crisis; excuse admits there is a crisis but minimizes organizational responsibility for the 
crisis; justification admits a crisis exists but downplays its severity; ingratiation tries to create 
positive impressions of the organization by reminding stakeholders of past good works, associate 
the organization with positive qualities or both; corrective action attempts to repair crisis 
damage, prevent a repeat of the crisis, or both; and full apology and mortification take 
responsibility for the crisis (p. 180).  Marcus and Goodman (1991) used a similar continuum.  
They explained that strategies that take responsibility or take action are accountable strategies 
while defensive strategies refuse to believe there has been a crisis or deny responsibility for the 
crisis.   
Huang, Lin and Su (2005) list five crisis communication strategies.  Denial includes 
statements made by the organizations that completely deny the “occurrence or existence” of the 




should not be held responsible for the occurrence and/or impact the questionable event because 
certain factors limited the person's control over the occurrence and/or impact of the event” (p. 
235).  Justification statements made by organizations admit that the accused may be responsible 
for the crisis, but “the standards being used by the accusers to evaluate the impact of the 
questionable event are inappropriate” (p. 236).  Concession statements admit that the event 
happened and that the accused person or organization “caused the event, apologized, and 
expressed the willingness for remediation, rectification and proactive works, changed corporate 
policy, and provided adaptive and/or instructive information” (p. 236).  The author’s final crisis 
communication strategy, diversion, states that organizations try to divert attention away from the 
crisis by distracting the public and the media by “creating a different issue or temporarily easing 
public anger by showing regards (while not apologizing)” (p. 236). 
Benoit (1995) developed the theory of image restoration, which is the use of 
communication strategies to redress the wrong doings of a crisis.  He identified five image 
restoration strategies including: denial, evasion of responsibility, reducing the offensiveness of 
the act, corrective action and mortification.  Finally Kauffman (2000), author of many articles of 
NASA’s communication strategies developed three rules of crisis communication that 
organization should do including: respond quickly, tell the truth and provide a constant flow of 
information, especially to key publics.  While dealing with a crisis once it happens is important, 
organizational leaders should also engage in crisis management.  Fearn-Banks (2007) defines 
crisis management as “a process of strategic planning for a crisis or negative turning point, a 
process that removes some of the risk and uncertainty from the negative occurrence and thereby 




engage in crisis management, more crises may be averted. 
Communicating in the Public Sector  
Few researchers have focused on communication in public sector organizations, however 
it is important to understand the impact of these organizations on every day life.  Almost 20 
percent of the population works for a public organization and every citizen’s life is impacted by 
the activities of these agencies (Graber, 1992, p. 3).  Public organizations are “institutions 
established by government at various levels to carry out governmental functions” and include 
administrative departments and agencies at the federal, state and local levels (Graber, 1992, p. 8).  
As part of the political system, the “structure, resources, personnel, goals and even day-to-day 
decisions” of public organizations “are shaped by political events” (p. 8). 
Public organizations are often forced to adjust their goals depending on the political 
climate of the time.  According to Graber (1992), organizations will align themselves with 
certain political leaders in order to gain increased financing.  Because of this, public 
organizations are often highly concerned about their image with the heads of the agencies often 
striving for “fast and visible demonstrations of progress” (Graber, 1992, p. 11).  Some 
researchers cite NASA’s concern about its image as a major factor in the 1986 Challenger 
explosion.  Graber (1992) writes that top administrators may have ignored safety concerns that 
would have delayed the shuttle launch in order to prove NASA’s ability to succeed with an on-
time launch. 
Public and private sector organizations also have different ways to measure success.  
Public sector organizations often measure success in terms of the breadth of the mission given to 
them by the government, the size of their budgets and staff and the amount of satisfaction given 




public sector organizations are responsible for informing the public of their actions.  The media 
and interest groups are often able to perform this function for the public (Graber, 1992).  
However public organizations must walk a fine line between revealing too much information, 
under the Privacy Act of 1974, and not divulging enough information, under the Freedom of 
Information Act. 
A final challenge often faced by public organizations is a high rate of turnover at the top 
of the chain of command.  Many top administrators are political appointees who stay for an 
average of only 22 months in their posts (Graber, 1992).  Many administrators are not in office 
long enough to gain a full understanding of their agency, let alone the complicated 
communication processes of the agency.  This can create an atmosphere of low morale within the 
agency, sometimes causing lower level administrators to hold back information because of a lack 
of trust with the field of rotating top administrators. 
Due to the lack of research on public sector organizational communication there are few 
theories or models that focus on public sector organizational communication.  Garnett (1992) 
developed a strategic contingency model of government communication.  He writes, “Effective 
government communication involves analyzing situations and designing appropriate strategy” (p. 
35).  The strategic contingency model begins with four situational factors.  The first called 
objectives for communicating includes: to inform, to influence attitudes and to affect behavior.  
The second objective, audience, includes factors surrounding what an organization needs to 
know about its audience including position, background, role, interests, knowledge, needs and 
impact.  The third objective, the management situation includes the organizational strategy, 
nature of routine, organizational climate, organizational state, leadership styles, mission and 




final objective includes the position, ability, credibility, interests, influence, background and 
preferences of the sender.  These four objectives influence two strategy design factors, which are 
the selection of the medium and the crafting of the message.  When devising a message the 
sender must take into consideration the messages content, organization, tone, analysis, style, 
length and timing.  Depending on the type of message the choice of media can become 
important.  Different types of media may include letters, memos, reports, proposals, cables, 
releases, newsletters, meetings, briefings, telephone conversations, computer correspondence and 
body language.  “Both situational factors and strategy design influence communication and 
management outcomes—government results” (37).  This model can help government officials 
better communicate with those in their organizations. 




 Nine years after its conception NASA faced its first major tragedy when a fire broke out 
in the capsule of Apollo 1, killing all three astronauts onboard.  The disaster happened at 6:31 
p.m. on January 27, 1967 at Cape Kennedy during a routine preflight test.  The fire killed 
astronauts Gus Grissom, Ed White and Roger Chaffe.  Investigations determined that a spark in 
the wiring mixed with the pure oxygen in the hatch caused the fire to spread quickly.  The 
astronauts had no chance of getting out alive (Kauffman, 1999). 
 After using excellent public relations strategies to promote the Mercury and Gemini 
space programs, NASA’s public relations and crisis communication efforts following Apollo 1 
were unsuccessful.  NASA failed to utilize the three basic steps organizations in crisis should 
use: respond quickly, tell the truth and provide a constant flow of information (Kauffman, 2000).  




information while refusing to release other information and instituted an investigative board 
made up entirely of people with close ties to NASA and the Apollo 1 mission.  NASA argued 
that the two-hour news blackout was due to an inability to reach the wife of one of the 
astronauts; however the policy caused the media to speculate that NASA was trying to cover-up 
the accident.  As a result of the media blackout, the media went to other sources for information.  
When NASA finally released information it said, “There has been a fatality” then later revised its 
statement to say, “There has been fatality.”  This mistake made those in the media suspicious and 
led them to doubt NASA’s response to the disaster.   
NASA lost more credibility with the media when officials said an internal power source 
was involved in the fire, however the power source had nothing to do with the accident.  Later in 
the day, NASA officials met with President Lyndon Johnson and asked that they be able to 
appoint their own review board.  The board, made up entirely of NASA officials, drew scrutiny 
from the media, Congress and the American public.  Once the committee was organized NASA 
decided to withhold all evidence and information from the press until the investigation was 
completed.  Officials asked all NASA personnel not to comment on the fire until the review 
board had concluded its investigation.  After an uproar from the media NASA finally allowed 
one reporter, George Alexander, to view Apollo 1.   
NASA hoped that the release of its report, named the Apollo 204 Report, would satisfy 
the media, Congress and the American public and help restore its credibility.  In his own report 
Apollo Program Director Major General Samuel Phillips pushed most of the blame to contractors 
North American Aviation, the manufacturers of Apollo 1’s capsule.  When the reports were 
published, it was determined that NASA lied in both reports and to tried to keep its Apollo 204 




again.  It was also discovered that the two reports did not correlate, making both untrustworthy.  
Also in testimony before Congress, Phillips, NASA Administrator James Webb and other NASA 
officials lied to Congress about the accident.  The media fired back with articles and editorials 
criticizing NASA for lying and misleading them and the American public.  To push attention 
away from its problems NASA tried to get the media to focus on the future of the space program 
including plans for future space flights and the possibility of a moon landing.  However, the 
media were not fooled by NASA’s plans and continued to criticize the organization by stating 
that it should not plan for new flights until it was able to solve the problems brought up by 
Apollo 1. 
NASA’s Assistant Administrator for Public Affairs Julian Scheer said that the 
organization had contingency plans for disasters in space, but none for emergencies on the 
ground.  By not being prepared with a crisis communication plan, NASA was not ready for the 
fire that broke out aboard Apollo 1.  The agency’s poor communication efforts following the 
accident prolonged the crisis (Kauffman, 1999).  Had NASA reported the facts concerning the 
accident, not speculated on its cause, not lied to the media and Congress and assumed 
responsibility the crisis would have passed much faster.  NASA learned its lesson the hard way 
and three years later utilized what it had learned from Apollo 1. 
Apollo 13 
 Only three years after the Apollo 1 disaster NASA faced another crisis when astronaut 
Jim Lovell uttered the now famous words, “Houston, we’ve had a problem,” on April 13, 1970 
(Kauffman, 2001).  Although previously ignored by most media and a majority of the American 
public, the plight of astronauts Lovell, Fred Haise and John Swigert was soon broadcast on 




For four days the world waited to see if the astronauts would be able to make a safe return to 
Earth.  It was determined after much deliberation that a problem originating in the oxygen tanks 
mixed with other slight failures in the mechanical systems led to an explosion, crippling the 
spacecraft.  NASA, Congress and the media would ultimately give the ordeal the name “A 
successful failure” when the three astronauts returned safely to Earth (Kauffman, 2001). 
 Learning from its mistakes with Apollo 1, NASA followed the three steps of crisis 
communication by responding quickly, telling the truth and providing a constant flow of 
information.  After Apollo 1, NASA developed a crisis communication plan.  Part of the new 
plan allowed two reporters to listen in on the communications between the astronauts and 
mission control.  When NASA determined that a disaster had occurred, two reporters, one print 
and one broadcast, were allowed into mission control.  NASA continued to give the media 
information by scheduling a press conference at 12:20 a.m. only three hours after the problem 
with Apollo 13 was reported.  NASA was praised for its prompt and candid response to the 
problem.  NASA refused to speculate on the current situation or the future of the space program 
and gave the media strictly facts.  High- ranking officials and former astronauts were used as the 
spokespersons for the agency.  However by using many people to speak for the agency, NASA 
ran into the problem of the organization not speaking as one voice.  NASA Administrator 
Thomas Paine had to correct comments made by Director of Flight Crew Operations Deke 
Slayton and Apollo 13 astronaut Jim Lovell (Kauffman, 2001). 
 Bolstering was a favorite public relations strategy NASA and President Richard Nixon 
employed during the Apollo 13 disaster.  Using the “frontier narrative” and “characterizing 
Apollo 13 as a success” NASA was able to bolster their image (Kauffman, 2001).  They also 




thirty minutes after the crew landed NASA appointed a review board to investigate the cause of 
the failure, but this time the board was made up of people outside the organization and NASA 
employees who were not directly responsible for Apollo 13.  The rhetoric used by NASA, 
including the phrase “successful failure” was picked up by the media and Congress.  The media 
portrayed all of the astronauts as heroes.  Finally Congress gave NASA more money the year 
after the crisis than it had any other year.  NASA’s image had plummeted after Apollo 1, but 
rebounded after Apollo 13 (Kauffman, 2001).  Nearly sixteen years later its image would be 
tarnished yet again. 
Challenger 
 After three days of bad weather the space shuttle Challenger finally took off from 
Kennedy Space Center on January 28, 1986.  Sixteen years after NASA’s last crisis and 73 
seconds after takeoff the space shuttle exploded only 10 miles off the Earth’s surface.  All seven 
of the astronauts on board were killed in the blast.  Investigations eventually determined that an 
oxygen ring seal on the right side of the solid-fuel rocket malfunctioned because of the cold 
weather the day of the launch (Martin & Boynton, 2005; Cabbage & Harwood, 2004; CAIB, 
2003). 
 Although NASA had a contingency plan for disasters the organization did not utilize the 
plan during the Challenger disaster.  NASA failed to hold regular press conferences, kept 
information from the media and made NASA personnel unavailable for questioning.  Unlike 
during Apollo 13 reporters were not allowed into mission control once a disaster scenario was 
determined.  When press conferences were finally held, NASA limited the statements to just a 
few sentences, and took few, if any, questions.  All personnel were asked not to talk to reporters.  




spokespersons.  The range of spokespeople led NASA to not speak in a unified voice, limiting its 
ability to maintain a constant flow of information to reporters.  After disastrous public relations 
strategies following the Challenger disaster NASA would face another tragedy less than twenty 
years later, however this time the agency would utilize its crisis communication plan (Martin & 
Boynton, 2005; Kauffman, 1997; CAIB, 2003). 
Columbia 
 Seventeen years after Challenger at 9:10 a.m. on February 1, 2003, the space shuttle 
Columbia and its crew were only forty miles from Kennedy Space Center when the shuttle 
exploded during re-entry to the Earth’s atmosphere.  The explosion killed all seven astronauts 
onboard (Martin & Boynton, 2005; Kauffman, 2005; Cabbage & Harwood, 2004).  On February 
2, The New York Times released excerpts from a NASA news conference at Johnson Space 
Center.  Ron Dittemore, the shuttle program manager said “The first indications of a potential 
problem occurred minutes before 8 o’clock Central Standard Time.  The first indications were of 
the loss of censors, temperature sensors in the hydraulic systems on the left wing, both the left on 
board and the left outboard 11 temperature sensors.  They were followed seconds and minutes 
later by several other problems, including the loss of tire pressure indications on the left main 
gear and ten indications of excessive structural heating.” (The New York Times, 2003)  
Dittemore, however did not speculate on the cause of the accident, explaining that it would take 
time and extensive investigation before NASA understood the cause of the accident.  Debris 
from the shuttle spread across several hundred miles covering parts of Texas and Louisiana.  It 
was later determined that a foam strike was the cause of the explosion (Martin & Boynton, 2005; 
Kauffman, 2005; CAIB, 2003).  Following the accident many people wondered about the 




officials said, “Even if flight controllers had known for certain that protective heat tiles on the 
underside of the space shuttle had sustained severe damage at launching, little or nothing could 
have been done to address the problem” (Chang, 2003).  In addition officials revealed that it took 
a frame-by-frame review of videotape the day after launch to determine that foam had hit the 
orbiter.  Re-entry at that time would have posed the same risks as it did at the time of the 
accident. 
 Unlike past disasters in NASA’s history the media were able to report the explosion of 
Columbia the moment it happened.  Thanks to NASA Administrator Sean O’Keefe NASA was 
able to follow a carefully detailed crisis plan.  The Agency Contingency Plan for Space Flight 
Operations, put into place after O’Keefe’s arrival in 2001, was updated after every flight to 
ensure that it covered all possible emergency scenarios.  The ways in which NASA was able to 
successfully handle the crisis are discussed in detail later in the study. 
Agency Contingency Plan for Space Flight Operations 
 NASA’s crisis plan, the Agency Contingency Action Plan for Space Flight Operations 
(2003) details how the organization handles crisis situations.  Put into place shortly after 
Administrator Sean O’Keefe arrived in 2001, NASA relied heavily on the plan during the 
Columbia disaster.  The Agency CAP for SFO details the responsibilities of the NASA 
Administrator, the Associate Administrator for the Office of Space Flight, NASA Headquarters, 
OSF Field Centers, the Office of Space Flight Programs and any contractor personnel during a 
crisis situation.  The plan explains that it is NASA’s “policy to report, investigate, and document 
NASA mishaps” (p. 1).  NASA requires that the contingency plan be simulated at least once 




Throughout the plan, NASA does not use the term crisis, but instead defines “any 
mishap, mission failure, incident, or high visibility close call that causes or may cause a major 
impact to space flight operations or prevents accomplishment of a primary mission objective” as 
a SFO mishap (p. 1).  The Agency CAP for SFO defines five categories of mishaps and close 
calls.  A NASA mishap is defined as “an unplanned event that results in injury to non-NASA 
personnel caused by NASA operations, damage to public or private property (including foreign 
property) caused by NASA operations, occupational injury or occupational illness to NASA 
personnel, damage to NASA property caused by NASA operations or mission failure” (p. A-1).  
The plan then breaks mishaps into five distinct categories (p. A-2).  Close calls are not included 
as a type of mishap. 




Damage to                              Injury/Death 
Property,  
Facilities or            
Equipment 
                           AND/OR 
Investigation/Analysis 
Type A Mishap Equal to or greater 
than $1M 
Death Administrator or 





Type B Mishap Equal to or greater 
than $250K but less 
than $1M 
Permanent 
disability of 1 or 
more persons, or 
hospitalization of 3 
or more persons. 
AA/OSF or Center 
Director appoints 
investigation* 
Type C Mishap Equal to or greater 
than $25K but less 
than $250K 
Occupational injury 
or illness that 












(Table 1 Continued) 
 
Incident 
Equal to or greater 
than $1,000 but less 
than $25K 
Injury of less than 
Type C Mishap 
severity but more 
than first-aid 
severity 
Same as Type C 
Mishap 
Mission Failure A mishap of whatever intrinsic severity 
that prevents the achievement of primary 
NASA mission objectives as described in 
the Mission Operations Report or 
equivalent document. 
An investigation 
board is required and 




Close Call** No 
equipment/property 
damage equal to or 
greater than $1,000 





accordance with its 
potential 
* If event involves more than one Center or has significant public interest, the AA/OSF, or 
delegated agent, may recommend that the Administrator activate the International Space Station 
and Space Shuttle Mishap Interagency Investigation Board. 
** Event that possesses high severity potential for any of the previous types of mishaps. (A-2). 
 
When deciding to report a mishap, NASA officials must decide what to report, when to 
report and who will report the occurrence of the mishap.  NASA requires that all mishaps, high-
visibility mission failures and high-visibility close calls be reported to the Associate 
Administrator in the Office of Space Flight (AA/OSF).  All mishaps should be verbally reported 
within 60 minutes of the occurrence.  OSF Center Directors, OSF program/project managers or 
non-OSF management employees who are responsible for OSF programs or projects report to the 
AA/OSF who in turn notifies the administrator and AA for Safety and Mission Assurance 
(AA/SMA). 
In the event of a mishap “the appropriate organization will ensure that all necessary 
actions are taken to preserve life and prevent further injury, prevent further loss of resources and 
securing, safeguarding and impounding evidence” (p. 2).  The AA/OSF is the NASA official 
who declares a mishap/contingency and is responsible for notifying the administrator and 




of the mishap/contingency.  The administrator or other designated official determines “what 
immediate telephone notification, if any should be made before the Headquarters Contingency 
Action Team (HCAT) meets” (p. 2).  If an SFO Mishap Response Telephone Conference is 
needed the AA/OSF, Deputy Associate Administrator for International Space Station and Space 
Shuttle Programs (DAA/ISS and Space Shuttle Programs), AA/SMA, Associate Administrator 
for Public Affairs, other appropriate staff, responsible center directors and program managers 
will be notified.  The SFO Mishap Response Telephone Conference is initiated within 2.5 hours 
of the mishap. 
Following the SFO Mishap Response Telephone Conference, the HCAT Coordinator, 
usually the DAA/ISS and Space Shuttle Programs, contacts the other members of HCAT for 
their own teleconference.  During the HCAT Telephone Conference the administrator is 
responsible, in conjunction with the HCAT, to decide who should be notified outside of NASA, 
what statements should be made to the media and if any changes should be made to HCAT.  The 
AA/OSF is responsible for reporting the outcome of the SFO Mishap Response Telephone 
Conference to the HCAT.  This includes “the extent and nature of the mishap/contingency, the 
sequence of events leading to the mishap/contingency and whether an initial determination of a 
possible cause has been made” and “actions taken or planned, including deployment of NASA 
personnel and assets, actions involving outside personnel or assets and program actions for 
mishap/contingency disposition” (p. 3).  The administrator and HCAT will then decide whether 
or not to appoint a mishap investigation board, notify the President, notify key members of 
Congress or have the Office of External Affairs notify other countries.  HCAT will also 




situation, if anyone else outside the agency needs to be notified of the mishap/contingency and 
the need for other statements and briefings for the media. 
While most of NASA’s high-ranking officials and members of HCAT have some 
communications responsibilities, most fall with the Assistant Administrator of Public Affairs 
(AA/PAO).  During a mishap/contingency situation the Public Affairs Office (PAO) provides 
support for “the OSF Headquarters Action Center, the on-site investigation, the lead Center 
investigation team, and the accident investigation board” (p. 6).  The AA/PAO is responsible for 
giving the AA/OSF copies of any video, audio or still photography that may be related to the 
contingency and advise the AA/OSF and administrator on the proper dissemination of that 
information.  The AA/PAO is also responsible for notifying the White House Press Office and 
coordinating any NASA TV “coverage/commentary including the continuation/discontinuation 
of NASA network communications over NASA TV” (p. 6).  NASA’s first official statement 
made to the media and the coordination of information that must be sent to other NASA Center 
newsrooms and through the Internet is the responsibility of the AA/PAO.  The Senior Agency 
Official in Washington (SAO-W) actually makes the public statement.  Other responsibilities 
include managing news queries and coordinating news releases in conjunction with AA/OSF, 
Deputy AA for ISS & SS Programs, Center Directors and Program Managers.  Finally the 
AA/PAO attends “mishap investigation board meetings, coordinating information to be released 
and arranging media briefings” (p. 6). 
 In her book, Crisis Communications: A Casebook Approach, Kathleen Fearn-Banks 
(2007) offers 22 components that should make up a crisis communication plan.  Based upon the 
last publicly released crisis plan, from 2003, NASA meets some, but not all of Fearn-Banks 




an organization’s success during a crisis, especially an organization with the history and size of 
NASA.  NASA’s Agency CAP for SFO contains Fearn-Banks first three components, a cover 
page, introduction and acknowledgements.  Fearn-Banks recommends that the plan be rehearsed 
every six months to one year and the plan should include rehearsal dates.  The Agency CAP for 
SFO requires rehearsal once every 18 months and does not list rehearsal dates.  For a public 
agency with a high degree of rotation among appointed, senior staff, NASA may want to practice 
the crisis plan more frequently and develop a system for monitoring rehearsals.  NASA does 
have the purpose and objectives of the plan, which clearly describe how to identify a mishap or 
contingency and how the plan responds to that mishap or contingency. 
Fearn-Banks suggests that a list of publics should be included in the plan.  While NASA 
does not separate publics out in list form, some publics including the President, Congress, the 
media, employees and the general public are addressed in the document.  The plan details the 
ways in which the publics will be notified and who is responsible for the notification.  One of the 
Agency CAP for SFO’s strengths is how clearly it identifies members of the crisis team.  The 
plan clearly labels the individuals who are on the crisis team, their titles and later goes into great 
detail about their responsibilities during the crisis.  Although a crisis directory does not appear in 
the 2003 Agency CAP for SFO, contact information is included in the current Agency CAP for 
SFO according to Bob Jacobs, NASA’s current Deputy Assistant Administrator for Public 
Affairs.  “We publish a contingency plan for every flight, although we don't make it public (since 
it has contact information, numbers, etc.). The fundamentals remain the same, although the 
contacts do change from time to time. But we do one for every flight” (personal communication, 
April 28, 2008). 




NASA’s plan identifies the Senior Agency Official in Washington as the person to make any 
public statements from the agency.  The SAO-W can be the Administrator or the Administrator 
can choose to appoint someone.  During Columbia, NASA Administrator Sean O’Keefe served 
as the SAO-W.  Fearn-Banks recommends that even if the head of an organization is “an 
effective spokesperson, he or she may not be particularly knowledgeable about a technical aspect 
of the crisis” (p. 302).  This was the case for NASA, which allowed several other spokespeople, 
including engineers and those directly in charge of human space flight to speak about the 
situation.  Recommendations are also made to have a list of emergency personnel and local 
officials.  While NASA does not have that list in its plans, it is difficult to estimate where a 
NASA disaster may occur.  Columbia required the activation of emergency crews from many 
cities and towns in Texas and Louisiana.  A list of emergency personnel in the cities where the 
field offices are located may help if a crisis strikes one of NASA’s 10 branches.   
Fearn-Banks suggests, “if particular editors or reporters are important to telling the story 
to the organization’s benefit, a list of their home numbers and emergency numbers will be 
advantageous” (p. 303).  While the Agency CAP for SFO does not list important media contacts, 
in NASA’s case it may not be necessary.  “We have a press corps that follows us and we know 
those people and they know the shuttle program inside and out and they know the orbiter inside 
and out and a lot of them know it much better than I do, or better than a lot of the 
communications people do because they grew up with the orbiter, they breathe this specific 
program, this specific element” (Bob Jacobs, personal communication, April 7, 2008).  With a 
group of reporters designated to cover NASA, the agency does not necessarily need to include 
media contacts in its plan. 




technology, including contact information for the spokespeople of related organization in its 
crisis plan could be helpful in a crisis situation.  This could be especially important if the crisis 
deals with a mechanical or technological failure that may have something to do with other 
organizations hired by NASA.  While the plan does not designate a particular room as a crisis 
control center it does recognize the importance for NASA officials to be centrally located.  This 
location is included when officials make contact for the SFO Mishap Response Telephone 
Conference and the HCAT Telephone Conference.  Officials will congregate in a room with the 
equipment and supplies needed to continue working on the crisis situation. 
Fearn-Banks also recommends gathering data and documents that may be needed and 
placing the documents strategically to guarantee availability during a crisis situation.  “The types 
of documents that can be gathered in advance include safety records and procedures, annual 
reports, photos, company backgrounders, executive biographies, company maps, branch office 
locations, quality control procedures, product manufacturing procedures and company fact sheets 
(including such data as number of employees, products manufactured, and markets served)” (p. 
305).  This goes hand-in-hand with her suggestion of a Web site that can be continuously 
updated and include information about the organization and crisis.  NASA’s Web site has an 
abundance of information and was used during Columbia to update the media and the public 
with pertinent information including URLs and links to other Web sites dealing with space flight 
or the United States government. 
Although not detailed in the crisis plan, NASA used the key message, “find the problem, 
fix it and fly again” (Bob Jacobs, personal communications April 7, 2008).  Fearn-Banks 
recommends that key messages “be accurate, brief, easy to use in a quote and memorable” (p. 




for trick questions from the media.  Paul Pastorek, NASA’s General Counsel at the time of 
Columbia, spoke with employees who were going in front of the media to prepare them for 
questioning.  “I asked some extremely hard questions of these folks before they ever got in front 
of the glare of the camera and the emotions and the anxiety you know you may say things that 
you don’t mean to say, you may have a really good answer at first, you might think about it 
twenty-four hours later and have a superb answer and I didn’t want all of those anxieties 
prohibiting those people to answer those questions well so I practiced with them” (personal 
communication, December 18, 2007).   
While NASA’s definitions of different types of mishaps and corresponding are another 
strength of the crisis plan it lacks what Fearn-Banks calls prodromes, or “warning signs” of a 
crisis (p. 308).  However, NASA as an organization has been through many crises, learned from 
the crises and is better prepared to handle crisis situations than other organizations may be.  
Fearn-Banks final component for a crisis management plan is an evaluation form.  Although not 
located in NASA’s contingency plan, the agency does review and if necessary update the 
contingency plan following each shuttle mission.  Jennifer Wood, Senior Advisor to Public 
Affairs at the time of Columbia said “There was obviously a review again of the plan after there 
had been a conclusion in the Columbia Accident Investigation Report, after it came out, and I 
think there were small tweaks made here and there, but overall I think the plan is very good” 
(personal communication, April 3, 2008). 
The strengths of NASA’s Agency CAP for SFO include the agency’s ability to remain 
true to the plan while allowing for flexibility.  NASA’s current Director of External Affairs at 
Johnson Space Center Eileen Hawley says “I’m often known for saying ‘Don’t fall in love with 




responding to a crisis” (personal communication, April 21, 2008).  The flexibility in the plan 
allowed NASA to be able to respond to issues in a timelier manner and respond to events that 
were not accounted for in the plan.  Other strengths include NASA’s insistence on regularly 
practicing the contingency plan and making sure that officials have the plan with them on launch 
and landing days.  “Bill Reedy, who was the head of space operations at the time, pulled his 
book out…” which included the contingency plan (Paul Pastorek, personal communication, 
December 18, 2007).  One suggestion may be for NASA to separate its communications efforts 
from the rest of the contingency plan.  Separating the communication section of the crisis plan 
from the rest of its contingency plan could make it easier to identify key publics, and specific 
strategies and tactics the agency could use during crisis situations.  The agency could also 
consider including in the plan pre-written press releases, news briefs or other tactics that could 
simply be filled in with pertinent information.  During crisis situation, when emotions run high, it 
may alleviate some of the stress of the situation. 
Crises and Other Organizations 
 Of course NASA is not the only organization in recent years to undergo a major crisis.  In 
his article “Exxon Valdez: How to spend billions and still get a black eye” William J. Small 
(1991) discusses Exxon’s greatest crisis and eleven lessons that can be learned from its mistakes.  
After the Exxon Valdez hit a reef off the coast of Alaska on March 24, 1989, Exxon’s handling 
of the crisis has been used as a case study of what an organization should not do when handling a 
crisis.  Small (1993) recommends candor and repentance when a crisis hits.  Exxon was neither 
candid with information, nor did it immediately offer repentance following the oil leak.  The 
time window following a crisis is also imperative to handling a crisis correctly.  An organization 




executives did not do.  Small (1993) also recommends that all organizations have a crisis plan 
and crisis team put together in advance and organizations should review the plans with some 
frequency.   
Two of Small’s (1993) recommendations concern the organization’s CEO.  He says that 
the CEO should usually go to the scene of the crisis, unless it can be handled just as well from 
home base.  The CEO should also be the spokesman during the crisis, unless unable to fulfill that 
role.  CEO’s should be trained to handle speaking to the media.  Small also recommends that the 
plan should include someone who can monitor all media coverage of the crisis so the 
organizations is aware of what the media is reporting.    
Communication was a major problem Exxon faced in its handling of the Valdez oil spill. 
Information traveling both within the company and outside the company suffered from a lack of 
a communication structure, particularly information that needed to travel quickly to top 
management.  Exxon was also unwilling to use creative ideas, such as bringing environmentalists 
to the scene of the spill.  Small recommends making friends with groups that can help during a 
crisis situation, including the press, important publics, politicians and even interest groups.  
Finally Small reminds organization leaders to use caution when advertising following a disaster.  
Advertisements should be used to “offset impressions that they find objectionable or simply to 
buttress their support” (p. 24).  
In May of 1996 ValuJet faced its own crisis and tragedy when flight 592 crashed into the 
Florida Everglades, killing all 110 of the people onboard (Englehardt, Sallot & Springston, 
2004).  Fortunately, ValuJet had a crisis plan in place and activated it once the plane crashed.  
The plan included immediately alerting the National Transportation Safety Board, sent officials 




with family members of the deceased.  ValuJet used both mortification and ingratiation in its 
corporate messages following the crash.  ValuJet also shifted blame to its maintenance company, 
SabreTech, for its mislabeling of oxygen canisters which proved responsible for the crash.  
ValuJet also failed to ever apologize for the crash, which Benoit (1997) says is one of the best 
strategies an organization can use following a crisis.  NASA’s crisis strategies have been both 
successful and unsuccessful over the course of its history.  As discussed earlier, NASA’s best 
crisis effort followed the Columbia shuttle disaster.   
Research Questions 
The remainder of this study focuses on NASA and the crisis communication strategies it 
used following the Columbia tragedy.  The study will seek to answer the following research 
questions: 
RQ 1: From an internal perspective, did NASA officials follow the detailed crisis  plan 
 that was laid out before the disaster or did the plan change as the disaster happened? 
RQ 2: From an internal perspective, which specific crisis communication strategies and 
 tactics did NASA use following the disaster?  
RQ 3: To what extent did NASA’s role as a public sector organization have an impact on 
 its crisis communication strategies and overall response to the crisis? 
RQ 4: Does NASA’s Agency Contingency Action Plan for Space Flight Operations 
 follow Garnett’s (1992) strategic contingency model for government agencies? 




CHAPTER 3: METHOD 
 To gain the best insight into NASA’s involvement with the Columbia space shuttle 
disaster from an internal perspective, the researcher based the study on Yin’s (2003) model and 
used qualitative research methods.  In-depth interviews were essential in gaining the proper 
insights into NASA’s crisis communication strategies and tactics. 
Case Study Approach 
Using Yin’s (2003) definition that a case study, “investigates a contemporary 
phenomenon in a real life context and multiple sources are used” (p. 33) this study uses a series 
of interviews with key NASA officials, employees and a journalist to gain a deeper 
understanding of the factors that influenced and contributed to the public sector organization’s 
response to the Columbia space shuttle disaster.  Case study methodology is often used “to 
contribute to our knowledge of individual, group, organizational, social, political and related 
phenomena” (1).  This study uses interviews with individual members of NASA in order to 
better understand the organization as a whole.  To better understand the “global nature of an 
organization or of a program, a holistic design” is used.  In this case, a holistic single case 
studied is used (43). 
This case study focuses on the events leading up to the disaster, including the 
implementation of a detailed crisis plan, the events of that day and the focus on both internal and 
external audiences following the explosion.  Using interviews helps gain a first-person 
perspective on the event, how public sector organizations must respond to crises and help to 
glean lessons learned that can be applied to later crises and other public sector organizations.  




to the questions above the researcher determined that case study methodology would yield the 
best answers. 
Data Collection 
 Following Grunig and Hunt’s recommendations (1984) the researcher spoke with 
members of NASA’s dominant coalition, or key decision makers during Columbia.  The 
researcher followed McCracken’s (1988) long interview method and interviewed key NASA 
officials, NASA employees and journalists via phone, email and in-person.  Interviews ran 
between 20 minutes and an hour and 13 minutes.  According to McCracken (1988) interviews 
“can take us into the mental world of the individual, to glimpse the categories and logic by which 
he or she sees the world” (p. 9).  The interview method allows the individuals to “tell the story in 
their own terms” (McCracken, 1988, p. 41).  All interviews were initially either by telephone or 
in-person.  Follow-up questions were asked via email.  Interviews were obtained through a 
snowball effect, with interviewees suggesting others within the organization.   
Two separate questionnaires were written, one for NASA employees and one for 
journalists who covered Columbia’s events.  Both sets of questionnaires helped answer research 
questions, including specifics about the crisis plan, specific strategies and tactics and how NASA 
as a public sector organization must respond to a crisis.  After the eight interviews clear patterns 
developed making only a few follow-up questions necessary.  
Subjects 
 The study consisted of seven personal interviews with NASA officials, other NASA 
employees and a journalist.  Personal interviews were done with Sean O’Keefe, former NASA 
administrator; Paul Pastorek, former general counsel; Glenn Mahone, former NASA chief of 




Wood, former senior advisor to the head of Public Affairs; Bob Jacobs, former NASA news and 
multimedia director and current NASA deputy assistant administrator for public affairs; Eileen 
Hawley, former news chief at Johnson Space Center and current director of external relations at 
Johnson Space Center; and Michael Cabbage, former Orlando Sentinel reporter and current 
member of the public affairs senior management team.  While the researcher conducted all 
interviews, five were via phone and two were done in-person (Table 2). 
Table 2 Interviews 
 
In-Person Interviews, Date of Interview, Length of Interview 
Sean O’Keefe, April 18, 2007, 43 mins. 
Bob Jacobs, April 7, 2008, 1 hr. 13 mins. 
Phone Interviews, Date of Interview, Length of Interview 
 Paul Pastorek, December 18, 2007, 34 mins. 
 Glenn Mahone, March 27, 2008, 20 mins. 
 Jennifer Wood, April 3, 2008, 25 mins. 
 Eileen Hawley, April 21, 2008, 20 mins. 
 Michael Cabbage, April 28, 2008, 29 mins. 
 
 Following each interview, the researcher transcribed the interviews and searched for 
themes that provided answers to research questions.  The interviews were recorded to ensure 
accurate transcription.  After reading each interview individually, the researcher grouped 
respondent answers into categories corresponding to research questions, additional common 




CHAPTER 4: RESULTS 
 As with all qualitative case studies, the results of the in-depth interviews cannot be 
generalized to all public sector organizations.  However, lessons can be learned from the ways in 
which NASA handled the Columbia disaster and those lessons can be applied to other public 
sector organizations.  Six common themes emerged from the interviews.  NASA officials 
revealed that they did not stray from the plan and that it served as a well-planned outline for the 
situation.  Each also commented that although the plan laid out individual responsibilities, it also 
allowed for flexibility.  Comments were also made concerning NASA as a public sector 
organization, its responsibilities as a public sector organization and how public and private sector 
organizations differ in how they report crisis situations.  Interviewees spoke in detail about the 
tactics used during the crisis situation.  The relationship between NASA and the media emerged 
as a common theme in the interviews.  Finally the most common theme involved NASA’s open 
and honest communication efforts the day of Columbia and the weeks and months that followed. 
Sticking to the Plan 
 As an agency that faltered after the Challenger explosion, NASA and its officials 
understood the need for a plan.  Eileen Hawley emphasized giving the plan some thought ahead 
of time, which allows personnel to think about how they’re going to manage the situation, who 
their potential audiences are that they need to reach and how the organization is going to do that.  
Bob Jacobs agreed calling crisis plans an “integral” part of any crisis.  Jacobs said, “You have to 
have a plan; you can’t go into it blind.  It’s very important that you sit back and you plan ahead 
for any eventuality.” 
 Jennifer Wood: “The fact is, it doesn’t matter how safe one’s workplace may be…no 




 and age that warrants it.  I mean there really is no excuse for not having one in my 
 opinion.” 
Repeated throughout the interviews was how closely the Agency CAP for SFO was 
followed.  All NASA officials responded that they deviated very little from the plan and that they 
thought the Agency CAP for SFO was well thought out and covered many areas of the crisis that 
required attention.  Jennifer Wood recalled deviating very little from the plan, adding that though 
there were adjustments none we so major that she even remembers them specifically.  She did 
mention, however that tweaks were made following the release of the Columbia Accident 
Investigation Board’s report of the accident. 
 NASA officials and employees also recognized the importance of practicing the plan to 
ensure that if they had a crisis situation occur that they would be prepared.  Officials at both 
headquarters and field centers spoke about the importance of practicing the contingency plan.  
According to Eileen Hawley the importance of practicing came down to timing.  She said they 
did not have to spend time figuring out what they were supposed to be doing or who should be 
planning the press conference.  Hawley added, “The trick in having a plan is if it just sits on your 
shelf it isn’t going to help anybody.  It has to be a living, breathing document.”  Glenn Mahone 
said the organization updated the plan constantly; the organization role-played and practiced the 
plan and organization leaders made sure their staff had copies of the plan.  He said, “…that’s the 
most important thing, you know you have to have it out there to the people who would play a 
role in it so that they wouldn’t make mistakes.” 
 Bob Jacobs: “It is something that we practice annually, we go through different scenarios 
 and there is one for every mission and it really helped because we literally followed it 




  Sean O’Keefe: “…to actually go through and exercise the plan, in a simulation type 
 environment helps.  Part of the plan is an investigative body.  Simulations  help to make 
 sure that everybody on that list knows that they are a part of that body and know what to 
 do.  The value of exercising it was demonstrated to me more vividly than I ever would 
 have dreamed.” 
 Clear Responsibilities 
  Each member of NASA clearly understood his or her role in the communications efforts 
following Columbia.  Practicing the plan made it easy for them to understand where they fit into 
the plan and the duties that the plan outlined for them.  Each NASA employee was able to clearly 
articulate his or her role during the crisis situation.  NASA Administrator Sean O’Keefe said his 
duties under the plan included notifying President Bush and the Chief of Staff.   
  Glenn Mahone: “I was the person who had the responsibility for, of course, determining 
 how, when and if we talked with the media, press conferences and all of those.  It was my 
 decision based on how and when we would have information and when we would be 
 prepared to put that information out to the general public and what statements would be 
 made.  I played a role and a major role in writing the statements and moderating the press 
 conferences and so forth, determining how long they would go, what questions we would 
 take and what questions we would answer and at what time.” 
  Employees who were not part of the crisis team still utilized the plan by finding other 
employees who needed help, working on documents and making themselves available to do 
needed tasks.  Jennifer Wood said that after making sure her duties with the administrator were 
taken care of, she went to the main press office building to see how she could help employees 




first priority was search and rescue.  
   Others remember the moments immediately following the disaster.  NASA employees 
immediately looked to the crisis plan to serve as a guideline for their next step.  Sean O’Keefe 
explained that when an event as tragic as the Columbia disaster happens and there is a lot of 
emotion and sadness surrounding the event, the crisis plan helps employees focus on what needs 
to be done.   
  Paul Pastorek: “He [Bill Reedy, associate administrator for space operations] pulled 
 out his book that he had with him, a three ring binder that had the plan and we began 
 immediately following the contingency plan.  The first thing to do was get the families 
 off the stands and out of view from the media and second thing to do was to call the  
 President and then were a whole series of phone calls that had to be made. Then we went 
 through a whole series of issues, dealing with media, writing comments for the media, 
 our media person, our head media person was not in Florida so I ended up writing 
 comments for Sean, we did a teleconference right after one o’clock.  We had the 
 President speak to the families over a cell phone feed and a bunch of stuff like that.” 
  While the plan provided clear descriptions of the responsibilities of essential personnel, 
employees recognized the need for flexibility in the plan.  Flexibility allowed employees to 
respond to events not covered in the plan, or respond to covered events in different ways.  Bob 
Jacobs said that its important not to make the plan so detailed that you are limited as to what 
your response can be.  Jacobs said plans must be flexible enough to allow for the “unknown 
unknowns.” 
  Eileen Hawley: “I’m often known for saying, ‘Don’t fall in love with the plan’ because I 




  Officials made it clear that while the plan spells out the responsibilities of each member 
of the HCAT, not all members may be present at the time of the crisis.  They recommend the 
plan be flexible enough to let others deal with the situation if needed.  Bob Jacobs said that while 
there were things the organization needed to do that were not covered in the contingency plan, 
because the plan clearly spelled out what needed to be done it was easy to add on additional 
responsibilities.  He said, “I think what would help other crisis communication planners is just 
focus on what needs to get done and let the people who are there at the time focus on how to 
accomplish it.” 
NASA as a Public Sector Organization 
  As a government agency, NASA is a public sector organization that is required to keep 
Congress and the public informed of its actions because it uses federal funds.  Interviewees 
described the difference in the ways public and private sector organizations must communicate 
during crisis situations.  Jennifer Wood said that because NASA uses taxpayer dollars, taxpayers 
deserve to know what is going on with the agency.  Other interviewees explained the difference 
between private and public sector organizations responses to crisis situations.  Eileen Hawley 
said that although it may be easier for small companies not to talk to elected officials or the 
public it may not be a smart decision for the organization.  She also said that as a government 
agency, NASA does not have that choice.  Glenn Mahone agreed and said that private 
organizations can give the public whatever they want, but government organizations have to deal 
with things like the Freedom of Information Act.  He said that the public has a right to know 
what is going on within government agencies because they are paying for government programs. 
  Bob Jacobs: “Private industry is just a little different because they report to different 




 their own employees before they need to report to the general public and one of the first 
 things that any corporate organization needs to identify is who are its stakeholders, who 
 are the various people they need to communicate with when something goes wrong or 
 even when something goes right.” 
Tactics Utilized During Columbia 
  Common throughout the interviews was the detailing of specific tactics used following 
Columbia.  Most tactics were outlined in the Agency CAP for SFO, but as stated earlier, 
flexibility with the plan caused tactics to be added depending on the situation.  The Agency CAP 
for SFO (2003) mentions the following tactics: public statements, appropriate releases of video, 
audio, or still photographs, notification of the President, coverage and commentary of the event 
on NASA TV, the naming of the headquarters spokesperson and press releases.  Press releases 
are as detailed as possible and identify how NASA will investigate the mishap.  Michael 
Cabbage remembered a press opportunity with NASA Administrator Sean O’Keefe two hours 
after the accident.  He remembered O’Keefe making a brief statement then not long after 
remembers Shuttle Program Manager Ron Dittemore’s press conference from the Jonson Space 
Center.  O’Keefe recalled using NASA TV as an in-house capability that allowed him to 
broadcast internally when necessary.  Using NASA TV he held agency wide town hall meetings 
to talk about the disaster, the developments, how it happened, what was going on and what the 
agency was doing to fix the situation. 
  Bob Jacobs, former NASA news and multimedia director and current NASA deputy 
assistant administrator for public affairs remembers setting up a “war room” at NASA 
headquarters that was used as a central point for the agency and had connections with all the 




that as factual information came out the agency updated the Web site with the newest 
information.  He also worked on the initial remarks for the administrator.  The administrator, 
immediately following the President, gave a press conference at the Kennedy Space Center 
explaining what the agency knew about the accident.  
  Jacobs also mentioned interviews with reporters, or live shots, during news programs and 
press briefings were key tactics.  NASA tried to do two press briefings daily, one in the morning 
and one later in the day.  The time of the press briefings remained constant to ensure that 
reporters knew when NASA officials would release information and allow questions.  Morning 
press briefings took place at NASA Headquarters in Washington, D.C.  Afternoon press briefings 
were at the Johnson Space Center in Houston, T.X. and consisted of more technical information.  
Michael Cabbage remembered the daily press conferences, the constant information releases and 
the large staff of public affairs officers who were available to help answer media questions. 
  Bob Jacobs: “We were doing multiple teleconferences each day with all the public 
 affairs officers…organizing whatever the latest fact sheets were and making broad 
 distributions, making sure everyone had the latest information and had the same 
 information.  We kind of divided the work, the field centers dealt with their regional 
 media…headquarters dealt with the majority of the network and the larger media.”  
  NASA’s Web site was instrumental in handling the crisis response.  It was updated just 
the night before the shuttle explosion and NASA used it to inform the public and the media about 
the events surrounding the disaster.  Countless documents were placed on the Web site, even 
documents that journalists had not asked for.  The importance of the Web site will be discussed 




 Reaching its employees proved important in NASA’s successful handling of the situation.  
To reach those employees NASA used email and emergency phone lines.  Eileen Hawley said 
that she used standard inter-office email to reach her employees.  She also used two different 
emergency lines that employees can call anytime there is an emergency to help answer questions 
about the accident.  NASA officials understood the importance of its employees in surviving a 
disaster like Columbia.  Bob Jacobs said that it is important to remember employees during a 
disaster because they are the ones that will help pull the organization through the crisis and it is 
important to make them feel part of the plan. 
 Since Columbia, NASA has utilized several tactics to make internal communications, 
both within headquarters, within field center and within the agency as a whole easier.  A survey 
was first used to determine the different ways in which the agency was currently trying to 
communicate and what was and was not effective.  Newsletters were used to facilitate the flow 
of information at headquarters and field centers, but there was no document for the agency as a 
whole. 
 Jennifer Wood: “We wanted to make it more an overall agency document so it would 
 serve dual roles.  Not only would it be an exciting document for all our employees to see 
 the great work that was happening throughout the agency instead of just at headquarters.” 
 Wood said the newsletter was also sent to members of Congress to keep them aware of 
“what the NASA funding was going toward, the great science, the great research and how it 
really was beneficial to continue to invest in this amazing agency.”  
NASA’s Relationship with the Media 
 One of NASA’s most important publics during the Columbia shuttle disaster was the 




channels, the media lost no time in discovering the Columbia disaster.  NASA immediately 
responded, giving the media as much information as possible all the while refusing to speculate 
on the cause of the media.  In the interviews, NASA officials discuss their relationship with 
media partners the day of Columbia and in the weeks and months that followed.   The 
interactions were overwhelmingly positive. 
 Glenn Mahone: “I think that we probably had the best operation going and some  of the 
 best media partners we could have asked for.” 
 Eileen Hawley said that many reporters covering the story were part of the NASA press 
corps, a group of reporters regularly assigned to cover NASA who had previous media 
relationships with many of NASA’s public affairs officers.  Michael Cabbage, a member of that 
press corps, said that there were members of the press who regularly interacted with certain 
NASA personnel on a regular basis and that during crisis situations familiarity helps because you 
know who you are dealing with and what the expectations are from both the agency and 
reporters. 
Bob Jacobs: “We have a core press, a press corps that follows us and we know those 
 people and they know the shuttle program inside and out and they know the orbiter inside 
 and out and a lot of them know it much better than I do, or better than a lot of the 
 communications people do because they grew up with the orbiter, they breathe this 
 specific program, this specific element.” 
  Although NASA has a press corps that regularly covers it, following Columbia, many 
reporters were sent to cover the event from around the country and around the world who had not 




and the shuttle program, officials found themselves leading “Shuttle 101” lessons to properly 
inform the journalists writing about NASA for the first time. 
 Bob Jacobs: “…when you have an accident the scope of Columbia, you have all the 
 reporters thrown at it and for the first couple of weeks you’re literally having to give 
 pointy end goes up lessons to reporters who are trying to figure out how to disseminate 
 this information to their audience.  And there were hundreds upon hundreds of them who 
 didn’t know anything about the shuttle program.” 
 Eileen Hawley: “…the bulk of them [journalists] of course were media who had never 
 covered the space program in their lives.  So we found ourselves in the midst of trying to 
 explain what happened to Columbia, dealing with people who barely knew the pointy end 
 was up, so we found ourselves doing what we would call Shuttle 101, trying to explain 
 highly complex things to reporter who had never even considered it before.” 
 Although the relationship between NASA and the media was good, the grace period 
eventually ended and reporters wanted answers.  Some tensions arose between NASA and the 
media.  Most tensions were between NASA officials and reporters who were not part of the 
NASA press corps. 
 Bob Jacobs: “…there is a compassionate period, goodwill, grace period of about four or 
 five days when you’re not getting the unanswerable questions, the how could NASA 
 allow this tragedy to happen type stuff.  Everyone is so focused within those first few 
 days with first just understanding the tragedy and getting their hands around what’s going 
 on.  But after that initial wave of information goes and gets out there, then it starts to 
 become a little more pointed, a little more critical, a little more news, the reporters 




 Eileen Hawley recalled that the change in how reporters covered the agency came after 
the memorial service.  She said that following the memorial service the general reporters left and 
investigative reporters took over.  Hawley said that the investigative reporters were more 
aggressive than the general reporters. 
 Former Orlando Sentinel reporter Michael Cabbage also remembered some tensions 
between NASA and some of the journalists covering the story.  He confirmed that tensions often 
originated with reporters who had not previously covered NASA.  Cabbage said reporters from 
outside the world of NASA sometimes became frustrated with NASA press corps reporters. 
 Michael Cabbage: “Most of the people…where there were tensions were people who 
 sort of parachuted in, who covered other beats and general assignment reporters from 
 other newspapers that didn’t usually cover the shuttle program who would drop in and be 
 frustrated by [corps reporter’s] ability to break stories and get inside information.” 
 Although at points following the Columbia disaster situations may have gotten tense 
between NASA and the media, NASA officials believe that the media efforts went well because 
journalists realized NASA was doing its best during a very difficult time.  Jennifer Wood said 
that although there were moments of frustration, reporters realized that “…at the end of every 
day we were doing our best to get them the information and because of that I think they 
respected us as a team, respected our plan and kept a good relationship with the agency after.” 
 When it came to recovering remains and parts of the shuttle, the media in Texas and 
Louisiana were valuable assets for NASA.  Parts of the shuttle that fell to Earth after the 
explosion were dangerous to humans and the media were crucial in getting that information out 




 Eileen Hawley: “…the media were remarkably helpful, especially the media in and 
 around East Texas and Louisiana because we had a huge debris field when the shuttle 
 broke up.  So they were very helpful in information their public what to do if you find 
 something.” 
Open and Honest Communication 
“…tell the truth, tell it all and tell it now.  And that was our mantra, we were going to be 
as transparent as we possibly could be” said Paul Pastorek of NASA’s communication efforts 
following Columbia.  The idea of open and honest communication, or transparency, was the 
most common theme echoed throughout the interviews.  From the beginning NASA took the 
position of being as open and honest with its information as possible, although as Bob Jacobs put 
it, it’s hard to hide information when NASA puts it “triumphs” and “tragedies live on television 
for everyone to see.”  The idea of transparent communication came directly from NASA 
leadership. 
Bob Jacobs: “One thing that helped us tremendously was that the administrator, Sean 
  O’Keefe at the time, made a flat out determination that anything up until the accident, 
 anything factual that we could release up until the accident would be released 
 immediately, without a lot of editing…in terms of government and corporate 
 management [it] was a very bold position to take…but open and transparent 
 communication is important.  Sean got it and exercised it and that’s why the agency, at 
 least in terms of a communications response standpoint, faired as well as it did publicly.  
 We’re probably one of the few government agencies who has openness and transparency 




As discussed earlier, in order to maintain transparency, NASA released information in a 
variety of ways to ensure that all questions could be answered correctly and in a timely fashion.  
Some at NASA even admit that the agency may have released more information than necessary 
immediately following the disaster, however they also agree that the agency benefited from the 
wide release of information. 
Eileen Hawley: “…when we got FOIA requests if…something was releasable, even if 
 we didn’t get a request for it, we put it out on our Web site so people could find it.  And I 
 think that helped.  Some of it is stuff that probably today if a reporter asked for the same 
 thing we wouldn’t release it, but give the unique circumstances, we felt like this is a 
 legitimate thing that we should release.” 
The idea of an open and honest agency led to a development of trust between NASA and 
the media.  Glenn Mahone said that NASA was an open organization that built strong 
camaraderie’s with the media.  He said that the media knew they could trust that NASA would 
not keep pertinent information from them and that open communication led to good 
relationships.  NASA, in the opinion of one interviewee, surpasses other federal organizations in 
their communication efforts. 
Michael Cabbage: “NASA, when compared to other government agencies, I always 
 thought was pretty darn good.  They were relatively open and in fact one of the better 
 government agencies about responding to media inquiries…about making officials 
 accessible for interviews…” 
 Some at NASA believe that unlike, private sector organizations, public sector 
organizations like NASA are held to different standards of transparency.  While private 




information public organizations must release to the public.  Jennifer Wood said that no matter 
the type of organization, all businesses should conduct themselves in the most forthright and 
truthful manner as possible.  She did admit, however, that federal agencies are held to special 
standards, but agreed with those special standards.  She felt that as a taxpayer herself she 
expected NASA to be open, honest and forthright with its information. 
While disclosure of information was paramount to NASA’s efforts following Columbia, 
the agency was careful about speculation on the cause of the accident.  Paul Pastorek emphasized 
that under no circumstances did the agency allow anyone to speculate on the cause of the 
accident.  Unfortunately for NASA, some spokespeople began to speculate.  However the agency 
quickly responded by issuing statements making it clear that the cause had not been determined. 
Bob Jacobs: “…you have to be careful when you’re being that open and that 
 transparent, not to start crossing into lines where people are getting you to  speculate 
 about what may or may not have happened…” 
As a public sector organization, NASA was inundated with Freedom of Information Act 
(FOIA) requests.  In order to alleviate the need for FOIAs, NASA released as much information 
as it could, as quickly as it could.  Bob Jacobs said that since the FOIA process itself takes time, 
the agency did not wait for FOIA requests, but tried to supersede the requests by providing 
information before the agency was asked.  Paul Pastorek said that when it came to public records 
the organization took the position that it was not going to exercise its right as an agency to 
withhold any documents, except those containing personal information.  This included releasing 
large amounts of data and email traffic. 
Providing information via the Internet proved to be NASA’s best way to get large 




information on the Internet as possible, even if the information had not yet been asked for.  This 
pre-emptive strike helped the agency handle the large volume of media inquiries and FOIA 
requests it was receiving at the time. 
Paul Pastorek: “…anything that was produced was put on the Web, not only did we 
provide documents pursuant to FOIA requests but we posted everything to the Web.  The 
transparency was pretty high.  Our position was if anybody asked for it and even if they 
didn’t ask for it we were going to put it up there.” 
While similar themes emerged throughout the interviews, each person interviewed was 





CHAPTER 5: DISCUSSION 
 Throughout its history NASA has struggled with its crisis communication efforts 
following mission disasters.  The organization is no stranger to being in tough situations 
following crises and has handled some well and faltered after others.  NASA’s poorest crisis 
effort followed the 1986 Challenger explosion.  However, NASA was able to learn from the 
mistakes it made following Challenger and was careful not to repeat them when they were forced 
to respond to Columbia in 2003.  Weick (1995) said that what is important is not the actual crisis, 
but how an organization deals with the crisis.  Under the leadership of Sean O’Keefe, the agency 
made sure that it had a crisis plan, that the crisis plan was practiced often and that everyone 
within the agency knew what the plan entailed. 
RQ 1: From an internal perspective, did NASA officials follow the detailed crisis  plan 
 that was laid out before the disaster or did the plan change as the disaster happened? 
NASA officials reported few deviations from what was laid out in the Agency 
Contingency Action Plan for Space Flight Operations.  Although communications efforts are not 
separated from other duties in the contingency plan, NASA members said they clearly 
understood the roles laid out for each of them in the plan.  Employees who were not included by 
name in the plan still understood what their responsibilities were and acted accordingly.  One 
reason the interviewees gave for the smooth efforts following Columbia was the fact that the 
plan was rehearsed often.  A crisis plan will work only if the members of the organization are 
familiar with it.  The easiest way to familiarize members of the organization with the plan is to 
have them practice crisis scenarios. 
Although the plan helped members of NASA immediately following the crisis, the 




they are anticipated to go and incorporating a certain amount of flexibility into the plan will help 
the organization when new problems arise.  Finally, NASA officials agreed that while the 
Agency CAP for SFO covered many areas of the crisis situation, there were still duties that had 
to be added in as they followed the plan.  Organizations should remember that it would be 
impossible to foresee every need that will arise following a crisis.  
RQ 2: From an internal perspective, which specific crisis communication strategies and 
 tactics were used following the disaster?  
NASA utilized several strategies and tactics in order to reach its publics following the 
Columbia disaster. According Coombs and Holladay’s (1996) three options or strategies that an 
organization in crisis could utilize, NASA used the third strategy. The organization chose to alter 
the perception stakeholders have of the crisis and work to protect and repair the organization’s 
reputation.  NASA also followed Kauffman’s (2000) three rules of crisis communication: 
respond quickly, tell the truth and provide a constant flow of information, especially to key 
publics. 
NASA used a variety of methods including news briefs, press conferences, interviews 
with officials, press releases and wide releases of information via its Web site.  NASA was also 
keenly aware that it had to reach its publics using different tactics.  To reach its employees 
NASA used its internal email system and hotlines to explain the severity of the situation and the 
proper procedures for employees.  In order to reach the public, NASA heavily relied on the 
media to disseminate valuable information, especially to residents of East Texas and Louisiana.  
It was crucial for NASA to reach the residents in order to keep them safe from parts of the 




Reaching the media was crucial to NASA’s success following the disaster.  The 
relationship between NASA and the media that covered the situation was mutually beneficial for 
both sides.  NASA helped the media tell the story to the public by providing them with 
information through press conferences designed to provide insight into both the technical aspects 
of the crisis and the overall efforts of the agency.  NASA also made sure it provided public 
affairs officials to answer questions.  NASA used its Web site to provide large amounts of 
information to both the media and the public including press releases, contact information, email 
records and other agency documents.    
Agencies following NASA’s example should recognize the need to use varying tactics 
when reaching their different publics.  According to Garnett’s (1992) strategic contingency 
model agencies need to remember who they are trying to reach with their messages and that will 
have an influence on the message and the medium used to send that message. 
RQ 3: To what extent did NASA’s role as a public sector organization have an impact on 
 its crisis communication strategies and overall response to the crisis? 
The difference between public and private sector organizations really comes down to two 
points.  Public sector organizations are held to the highest levels of authority: Congress, the 
President and the American public.  Private sector organizations tend to consider themselves 
responsible to their shareholders first and others second.   
NASA recognized the need to be forthright with its publics and built plans for transparent 
communication directly into its contingency plan.  The President, Congress and the public were 
immediately notified of the contingency situation and the agency fared better in the long run for 
disclosing the amount of information that it did.  Other government agencies could take note of 




RQ 4: Does NASA’s Agency Contingency Action Plan for Space Flight Operations 
 follow Garnett’s (1992) strategic contingency model for government agencies? 
Though no mention was made of following a particular model when creating the Agency 
CAP for SFO, NASA’s contingency plan fits into Garnett’s (1992) strategic contingency model 
for government agencies.  NASA’s goal concerning crisis communication in the contingency 
plan was to inform its publics, influence their attitudes and affect their behavior surrounding the 
Columbia disaster, meeting Garnett’s first objective.   The second objective, audience, includes 
factors surrounding what an organization needs to know about its audience including position, 
background, role, interests, knowledge, needs and impact.  NASA knew its audiences and how to 
reach them in the most efficient manner possible.  The third objective, the management situation 
includes information surrounding the organizational climate.  The agency makes it clear in the 
beginning of the contingency plan the structure of the organization and the subsequent 
responsibilities of the HCAT members. Garnett’s final objective requires organizational crisis 
planner to think about the selection of the medium and the crafting of the message.  Messages 
that are sent through the wrong medium or are poorly crafted may never reach their target 
audience, ultimately causing greater problems for the organization in crisis. 
The lack of information on public sector crisis communication strategies makes it 
difficult to find a model that NASA’s plan fits into perfectly.  The more research that can be 
done in this area of crisis communication will help build new models that can help other public 
sector organizations plan for crisis situations. 
RQ 5: Can NASA’s crisis plan serve as a model for other public sector organizations? 
NASA officials believe that their contingency plan could serve as a model for other 




and details the agency’s communications efforts.  With the lack of research concerning 
communications efforts with private sector organizations, NASA’s Agency CAP for SFO could 
be used as a model for other agencies. 
Limitations 
 The main limitation faced by this study was the inability to interview sources from 
outside the agency.  Although those from NASA provided insight into the organization’s crisis 
efforts at the time of Columbia, it is hard to assess NASA’s efforts without speaking with the 
publics the organization was trying to reach at the time.  The one “outsider” interviewed, 
Michael Cabbage who at the time was with the Orlando Sentinel, now works at NASA 
Headquarters.  In addition, only one person interviewed, Eileen Hawley, worked at a NASA site 
other than headquarters.   
Future studies may want to interview more members of NASA, including those from 
every field site and those who do not rank at the top of the chain of command.  Additional 
interviews may also be done with reporters who covered the event.  Due to time restraints the 
researcher was unable to speak with crisis communication experts, but future researchers should 
consider the insight those professionals could give on the subject.  Crisis communication experts 
may be able to offer their opinions on what NASA did well, what it could have improved on and 
how they would have handled the situation if it had been up to them. 
 Another limitation included the inability to cover the breadth of information gathered 
during the interview process.  Many studies could be written from the information provided by 
NASA personnel.  Future researchers may focus on NASA’s drive to improve its internal 






Public sector organizations have an impact on how Americans live their day-to-day lives.  
Much of their time is taken up by these agencies, whether it is filing taxes with the IRS or 
waiting in line at the Department of Motor Vehicles.  These agencies are responsible to the 
highest levels of authority in the country, Congress, the President and most importantly the 
American public.  As taxpayers who are footing the bill for government programs, citizens have 
the right to know what is going on within the walls of theses agencies.   
As one of these agencies, NASA receives its funding, made up of taxpayer dollars, from 
Congress.  What sets NASA apart from other federal agencies is its willingness to be as open and 
honest with the public as possible.  NASA demonstrated this during the Columbia accident, but 
tries to remain as transparent in its communication as possible at all times.  Even when not in a 
crisis situation, NASA disseminates as much information as it is allowed through various media 
channels, especially its Web site.   
Studies like this one can shed light on public sector organizations and help them 
understand the importance of transparent communication with their constituents.  Doing studies 
similar to this with other agencies could provide valuable insight into the type of information is 
regularly released by federal agencies.  In addition, the way NASA handled the Columbia 
accident could be used as a model for other public sector organizations.  Its policy of transparent 
communication is, in the opinion of the researcher, why the agency fared as well as it did with 
both the media and the American public following the disaster.  More importantly NASA’s plan 
could be used a guide for all organizations, not just public sector organizations.  Whether an 
organization is public or private, in the long run it will fare better by telling the truth as quickly 




in a timely fashion.  Every organization will face a crisis at some point in its history, but 
organizational leaders should recognize that a crisis situational does not necessarily signal the 
end of that organization.  NASA has proved that it is possible to bounce back from a crisis 




CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION 
 While evaluating NASA’s communication efforts following Columbia, it became clear to 
the researcher that there are many lessons to be learned.  Speaking with individuals who lived 
through a major crisis scenario and who handled it in such a way that it could be used as a model 
for other organizations proved that organizations without a crisis plan really have no excuse.  
Following a crisis, emotions can often run high.  NASA employees were not only dealing with 
the loss of a shuttle, but with the loss of seven colleagues.  When faced with that kind of tragedy 
a carefully laid out plan can help crisis team members move past the emotion and get to work on 
what needs to be done for their organization. 
 While making as detailed a plan as possible certainly helps when a crisis erupts, it is 
equally important to allow for flexibility in the plan.  While detailing what needs to be done 
following a crisis, assigning only one person to handle certain responsibilities may backfire on 
the organization.  Not all members of a crisis team are available all the time.  It is often more 
important to stress what needs to get done, rather than who is responsible for doing it.  Following 
Columbia, NASA employees who were not members of the HCAT were able to fill in to 
important roles not outlined for them in the crisis plan.  Organizations putting together crisis 
plans should also remember that not every communication tactic will reach all necessary publics 
or work in certain situations.  NASA found that its Web site was one of its biggest assets 
following Columbia.  It allowed the agency to easily disseminate documents and allowed 
reporters clear access to important information.     
 As discussed earlier, public sector organizations are held to different standards than 
private organizations when it comes to crisis response.  However, public organizations could 




by FOIA to release information, NASA used the situation to act, not react.  Instead of waiting for 
the requests to process the organization went ahead and released as much information as 
possible, hiding nothing from the media and the American public.  If all organizations were up 
front and honest in their communications efforts it would help them gain credibility with their 
publics and in most cases help resolve the crisis situation faster.  This leads to perhaps the most 
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APPENDIX A: INTERVIEW QUESTIONS 
 
NASA Officials and Employee—Interview Guide  
 
Before beginning interview ask if they can be recorded for accuracy. 
1. Name, position at NASA. 
2. What brought you to NASA?  Why did you begin working there? 
3. What day-to-day duties did/does your job entail? 
4. Explain your involvement the day the Columbia shuttle disaster happened? 
a. How did you find out? 
b. What was your initial reaction? 
5. Were you aware of the crisis communication plan before the shuttle disaster? 
6. How did you fit into the crisis communication plan? 
7. Was the crisis communication plan followed as written or were there changes? 
8. Explain your involvement with the media on the days and weeks following the explosion. 
9. There was no plan in place at the time of Challenger, do you think having a plan in place 
helped in the aftermath of Columbia? 
10. As a public sector organization, does/did NASA face challenges that a private sector 
organization does not? 
11. How did the internal communications work at NASA?  How did you reach the 10 NASA 
locations? 
12.  Is there anything you would have done differently? 
13.  Is the organizational culture of NASA conducive to internal communication?  Did that 




14. Do you think other organizations would benefit from having a crisis communication 
plan? Why/why not? 
Other questions will be asked during the interview to gain complete answers to questions, to gain 
further understanding of concepts and to get more detail on interesting subject matter. 
Media—Interview Guide for Michael Cabbage 
1. Explain your background as a journalist.  Were you always assigned to space/science 
stories?  How did that become your beat?  When did you first begin writing about 
NASA? 
2. Explain your involvement with NASA prior to Columbia.  Had NASA been open with 
information before the disaster?  Who was your main contact within the agency? 
3. If you had been to other landings, how did those work?  Were the procedures the same on 
the day of Columbia? 
4. Explain the day of Columbia.  When did you realize that something had gone wrong?  
What happened next? 
5. Was it obvious that there was some kind of crisis communication plan in place from the 
viewpoint of the media?  Did NASA seem prepared or unprepared? 
6. What was the relationship like between the media and NASA?  Was it a good 
relationship, a tense relationship? 
7. What about the relationship in the days and weeks following Columbia?   









APPENDIX B: INTERVIEWS 
 
Interview with Sean O’Keefe 
(In-person interview, April 18, 2007) 
 
On your first day at NASA you asked managers to bring to you their plans for responding to an 
accident.  Why was that your first priority?  Why was it important to update and rehearse the 
plan? Was it important to learn from the communication failures that occurred after Challenger? 
The question I asked them was what do you do if you have another Challenger.  It tells you a lot 
about the people and the organization generally and how they would respond to tragedies.  Given 
the fact that it was an altering event it would change everybody’s view of everything.  I was 
interested to see how they, the organization, and the people in it had learned from the prior 
incident, which had occurred in 1986.  I was interested in seeing what was on the shelf that was 
derived from that experience.  And what was there was a reasonably good product.  There was 
no product before Challenger.  As a consequence the way NASA reacted after that event was to 
just turn off all public communications.  They just didn’t anticipate that something like that could 
happen.  It was interesting to see when I had arrived whether or not they had thought about it 
sixteen years later.  And they had.  It said what needed to be upgraded and what didn’t.  It was a 
useful exercise.   
What about rehearsing and updating the plan?  Was that important? 
My impression of [the plan] was that it was a relatively good piece, a good foundation.  But 
relative to other similar contingency type plans for other comparable kinds of activities, I asked 
them to benchmark what we had similar to what other organizations had.  I wanted them to pick 
out things that were better about their plan and adapt it to our organization. And then to actually 
go through and exercise the plan, in a simulation type environment helps.  Part of the plan is 
creating an investigative body immediately.   Rather than sitting around the table on the day the 
accident happened and thinking up names, I wanted to have people appointed to that task well in 
advance.  So there would always be a list in advance.  Simulations help to make sure that 
everybody on that list knows that they are a part of that body and know what to do, who they’ll 
be hearing from.  So I had the space flight folks make up an event that would prompt the 
triggering of these activities.  So you would go down the list and call the numbers that were on 
the list and make sure that they really were the numbers that were listed and each of the people 
on the investigative team knew they have volunteered and agreed to do so.  So that morning 
when it happened they would know what was coming.  The value of exercising it was 
demonstrated to me more vividly than I ever would have dreamed. 
Explain the day that Columbia happened.  How were you notified? Was the crisis plan utilized 




Yes the plan worked about as well as you can image given the tragedy of the day’s event.  There 
was a lot of emotion and a lot of sadness around the whole event.  Nonetheless it didn’t deter 
people from going down the list, if anything the value of having a strategy or a plan like that 
minimized the emotional reaction people have, not because they didn’t have it, but at least they 
had something to do.  It worked much more effectively as a result of it.  I didn’t need to be 
notified I was there.  I was standing there with the families of all the crewmembers at the 
Kennedy Space Center on the runway waiting for Columbia to come back and when the 
appointed hour passed we all knew there was something wrong.  So it was within half an hour 
roughly of the breakup that it was pretty evident to everybody.  My responsibilities under the 
plan were to notify the President and call the chief of staff.  So I went down that list and did what 
I had to do.  It worked pretty flawlessly in that respect.  But it was a rough day.  It was the 
roughest day of my life.  Working with the media was an interesting challenge.  The president 
had told me that he would prefer that I did some kind of public announcement and that he would 
follow.  When we talked he wanted to know where the families were, how they were doing.  He 
wanted me to do my press conference and then we’ll tell the White House press folks that we 
would do a press conference here.  He said at some point he would like to speak to the families.  
Not many funny things happened that day, but the media was involved in one.  I was sitting in a 
room and CNN was on, but it was on mute.  I looked at the screen and in the crawler at the 
bottom it said NASA press conference at 10:30.  I looked at somebody and said, “Who’s having 
a press conference here?”  And they said “Well you are.”  And I said, “What do you mean?”  
And he said “Well it’s in the plan.”  It says within two hours we would have a press conference, 
and it was almost two hours from the time within when we became aware of the accident.  Well 
at that point we didn’t know what was going on, we were just then getting preliminary 
information, so we pushed it back to 1 p.m. and by that time were able to give the media all the 
facts we knew, so we could tell a complete story of what was happening.  But at 11 because the 
plan called for it, because the plan called for it, we were gonna do it. 
NASA was credited with open and honest communication following the disaster, but ran into 
some trouble with speculation.  What do you think happens to an organization when people 
speculate before knowing causes? 
On the day that this occurred and for the time thereafter, so much of what you learn from these 
experiences, and it’s a tragedy to learn it this way but it is a lesson, is that you set the tone for a 
lot of things.  What you do in the earliest going sets a very strong tone for the way things are 
going to go thereafter.  And by being open, candid and earnest about what we were doing, what 
we were engaged in, it really sent a very strong signal in addition to what I instructed to people 
and directed to people that we need to be open about this.  And if I was acting that way then 
everyone knew it was okay for them to act that way too.  So it created kind of a tone at the top 
kind of thing and its important to be mindful of because in the middle of situations like that, 
people in those kind of capacities were just trying to react, but that sets a tone too.  So before our 




these are the points I’m going to make.  And the tone was captured with a phrase that I used that 
captured everyone’s imagination thereafter, which was “we’re gonna find out what happened, 
we’re gonna fix it, then we’re gonna fly again.”  And in that terminology was, we’re going to be 
very open about what the problem was, because we don’t know and we want to find out what it 
is and then once we understand that, we’re going to do what we got to do to fix it and rededicate 
ourselves to the task.  And it settled a lot of things very fast, just in the phrase.  It stopped people 
from wondering what the future was going to be like, if our employees were still going to have 
jobs.  So it created the right atmosphere for people to feel like we need to go find out what 
happened here, so we could all find a solution together and we can all get back to doing this.  
And that worked about as effectively as anything I could have done.  That’s what hit me as being 
the most important messages to put forward in terms of what do you do from here on.  So the 
speculation stuff was inevitably going to happen.  I don’t know who contributed to it, but 
certainly I’m sure reporters had something to do with it, other people had something to do with 
it.  It usually happens when there is an absence of facts or data or information or whatever and in 
the beginning something you have the least amount of is reasonable, reliable facts.  So 
speculation runs rampant, people love to fill in the gaps.  In the days and weeks that followed my 
challenge was curtailing the engineers around NASA who would speculate on what they thought 
the cause of it was, based on incomplete facts.  So I got belligerent about laying out the facts and 
saying this is what we know, and this is what we don’t know.   
What specific communication strategies were used immediately following and in the 
weeks/months, etc. after the accident?  Focus on internal audiences?  External audiences?  Who 
were the publics that you and the communication department were focusing on most? 
NASA’s a big place.  It’s 20,000 people with ten different locations of scientists and engineers 
and technicians and folks who have nothing to do with the shuttle program and some folks who 
have a lot to do with the shuttle program.  So you get all these very wide ranging disciples and 
backgrounds and perspectives that stretch all over the country.  Trying to get everybody to feel 
some sense of responsibility for it was a very important role.  In my mind it was critically 
important that everybody feel some sense of accountability.  We all had some role to play.  
NASA TV fortunately is an instrument, a capability that broadcasts not only to the cable 
providers who get it, but is an in-house capacity to broadcast anytime you want, so I used that 
regularly.  We had agency wide town hall meetings to talk about this, the developments, how it 
happened, what’s going on, why things occurred and all that stuff.  And it was a very important 
communications mechanism.  And I sent an e-mail everyday and did all the normal press stuff.  I 
talked to all the center directors regularly. 
You’ve made comments about NASA’s organizational culture.  What do you mean by NASA’s 
organizational culture, and if there were problems how did you fix those? 
A lot of people to offense to that, because the notion was that there was something wrong with 




just that the focus is in a specific direction.  The safety mindset at NASA is obsessive.  It is an 
element that defines the attitude around the agency.  So the attitude was how could this possibly 
have happened here, and how can you tell me that we have something wrong with the culture 
here when we’re dedicated to safety objective in ways that put everybody else to shame.  You 
have to look at them and say, what constitutes safety and it comes down to industrial safety 
practices, but in a larger sense, that’s a tactical thing.  In the broader strategic view there wasn’t 
enough of a soul search over the things you didn’t know the answers to.  Looking at thing that 
you don’t know the answer to, asking why not, that was missing.  Foam had hit the shuttle many 
times.  So the engineering mindset was that if you had something that had happened enough then 
it wasn’t a big deal.  You have to have the inquisitiveness to know why something is or isn’t 
happening. 
 
Looking back at the situation are there things you would have done differently? 
 
I’ve lived my whole life, my professional life of making the point to never look backwards.  No 
amount of time that you spend doing that is going to change the event.  All the time you spend 
looking backwards always detracts from the amount of time you could spend looking forwards.  I 
don’t have any reservations about it, it is what it is, the record is what it is.  I did the best I could 
at the time and knowing what I knew at the time. 
 
Excerpt from conversation following interview: 
 
Everyone of these incidents, I don’t know if there are better or worse public relations or public 
communications responses, it’s the combination of events.  But the one variable is when you’re 
in a position where there is no strategy on how to deal with it, it just gets worse.  It compounds 
itself.  There’s no guarantee that its going to get any better on the front end if you have concerns 
added to it, but you have to have an approach on how you’re going to respond to it, but it isn’t 
likely to get exponentially worse. 
 
Interview with Paul Pastorek 
(Phone Interview, December 18, 2007) 
 
What was your position at NASA and what did that entail? 
How did you end up there? 
 
My dear friend Sean O’Keefe and I went to college together and we’ve known each other over 
the years and he asked me to leave the private practice of law and do some government service.  
So I for some strange reason decided to do that and actually worked for NASA from February of 
2002 to June of 2004.  And I served as general counsel there; general counsel is the senior legal 
counsel in that agency. And I had some other responsibilities too because of my relationship with 
Sean I tended to be very involved in the decision making of legal matters and so as a result when 
the accident happened I tended to be involved in, certainly there were many legal issues but other 
issues as well, communications and legal and you know a lot of technical relationships as well. 
 
Can you give a brief description of what a normal day looked like?  What were your day-to-day 





Best way to start is you know I ran an organization of about 130 lawyers and so you know I 
managed that organization and during the day I would have issues related to that and legal issues 
that were related you know basically NASA’s legal issues were focused around procurement as a 
lot of the money NASA spends is on contractors to do all of the complex work and on patent law 
… And then we have a contingent of lawyers for international law and space law, believe it or 
not you have to know a lot about space law in order to deal with international work and then we 
had general law, contracts, human relations, employment and labor and stuff like that, normal 
stuff that any organization would have.  So probably on any given day I’d spend between twenty 
percent and forty percent of my time really focused on legal issues. In the remainder of my time I 
served on the executive staff to Sean, so we would spend time in various executive meetings 
working on any number of issues. So for example we’d work on legislative agendas, trying to get 
budgets for our programs, communications issues, we’d work on technical issues you know 
people would…give you a crazy example we had to deal with the safety associated with 
launching the shuttle at Cape Canaveral and get into a lot of discussions with the Air Force as to 
who controls the space range firing at Cape Canaveral and we would get into a lot of discussions 
around how many people could be in proximity within the launch vehicle at launch and that leads 
to how many visitors could be at the site and that sort of thing so there were any number of either 
technical related issues or business related issues or political related issues that we would take up 
in executive staff type meetings so it would involve quite a bit of time on that.  To give you an 
example a little bit bigger picture NASA headquarters operates out of Washington, DC but 
NASA has ten operational centers with a number of sub-centers that operate all over the country 
so you know we would be working, I would be working on legal issues in the centers or I would 
be working on administrative management issues on Sean’s request.  You know I have the 
privilege of going out and handling difficult problems that had to be handled at Sean’s request so 
I would be, I was kind of an advisor without portfolio, a lawyer and an advisor within 
management. 
 
Describe the day of Columbia.  How did you find out?  How were you involved in the 
communications efforts following the accident? 
 
You know there is a person who is responsible for the flight and everything to do with the flight, 
that individual Bill Reedy was at the shuttle landing facility, Sean was at the shuttle landing 
facility and I was.  So we, all three, were standing at the runway, standing not too far from the 
families in the stands waiting for the shuttle to land.  It was actually a pretty nice day for landing, 
I can remember it like I was standing there right now, there were some low clouds at about 4,000 
feet they were thin, and kinda caused a little inability to see what was going on but nonetheless it 
was adequate weather to be able to land and while we were standing there we started hearing 
over the loud speaker, you can hear Houston folks talking to the shuttle, and there came a point 
we weren’t, we were relaxed and talking to different people saying hello generally being social, 
we then noticed that there was some discussion over the loud speaker, call checks for the shuttle 
that were not being responded, so Bill Reedy, who was the head of space operations at the time, 
pulled his book out came over to us told us that the signature double sonic boom had not gone 
off as expected. The sonic boom signals the shuttle has flown overhead and is getting ready to 
land, when that happens precisely on time and so we realized that had not happened and we 




something at this point had happened and Reedy probably understood it much better than either 
Sean or I understood it, he pulled out his book that he had with him, a three ring binder that had 
the plan and we began immediately following the contingency plan.  The first thing to do was get 
the families off the stands and out of view from the media and second thing to do was to call the 
President and then were a whole series of phone calls that had to be made.  We didn’t get the 
President directly but Sean spoke to his chief of staff and within a short period of time we were 
in a car following families to the location, astronaut locations, a residence where the astronauts 
reside and then we went through a whole series of issues, dealing with media, writing comments 
for the media, our media person, our head media person was not in Florida so I ended up writing 
comments for Sean, we did a teleconference right after one o’clock we had the President speak to 
the families over a cell phone feed and a bunch of stuff like that.  We basically stayed, the three 
of us stayed at Kennedy for the entire day, we finished the beginning of the recovery operations 
from Kennedy and probably around eight or nine at night we flew back on a corporate jet back to 
Washington, DC met with out senior staff at eleven thirty that night and plotted how we were 
going to deal with various issues until about one o’clock that morning and I think Sean was on 
the Sunday news that next day around eight o’clock that morning, he spent the whole morning on 
TV being interviewed by various assundry of people and Reedy and I were in the background 
helping him out. 
 
What about in the days that followed, what roles did you play? 
 
Well the three of us really played a very team role I suppose.  Dealing with all things, dealing 
with principally and primarily the families and all sorts of things that were related to the families 
such as taking care of keeping them out of the media, that was one of our primary concerns 
trying to begin to deal with the consequences of the loss.  That was once piece of it, you know 
Reedy probably took the lead on that but we would circle back together periodically in the days 
following that, making sure we were dealing with that making sure we were dealing with it 
correctly.  On the Saturday after the accident Sean and I went over to meet with the President, his 
entire senior staff were in the oval office, explained to him all of what we knew at that time, I 
helped do the briefings for Sean, Sean handled it himself.  And you know on Tuesday we flew 
down to Johnson Space Center, the President came down and did a memorial service, Sean came 
down on Tuesday or Wednesday on Air Force One, we went down a different way and went 
down for that and came back to DC had a memorial service at a cathedral there in Washington, 
the Vice President spoke and its sort of interesting I suppose because we at one hand had to deal 
with the families and the other hand you had to deal with the country and then were was a whole, 
another piece we had to deal with our international partners and then we had to deal with our 
agency. You know the agency is an unusual group of people frankly, not your typical agency, 
very united group, refer to themselves as NASA family and you had this loss and it had a real 
tremendous impact that had an impact on the employee workforce, a lot of guilt so we had a lot 
of issues to deal with internally and then we still had two astronauts flying in space at the time 
who were wondering how they were gonna get back home.  So all of those issues, we had several 
funerals, several memorials we had to attend, then the hearings began in Congress, several 
hearings on why the thing crashed, all kinds of wild theories were being put out there, all kinds 
of wild investigations, probably the most remarkable was the environmental laws had changed 
and caused the shuttle to be made less safe because of how it was constructed and you know 




we had to deal with, the government, had to deal with Congress hearings and investigations then 
we began working with our employees one of the specific things we did particularly in the legal 
department was work with our employees and prepare them for testimonies, media testimonies, 
congressional testimonies, we had three people who were identified as being on the watch at the 
time of the accident and there was some blame that was trying to be attributed to these three 
people, one of whom got up in front of the media and before she did we were able to get to her, 
to talk with her, to help her deal with the questions that she would be asked.  Linda Ham was her 
name, and she was one of the three people who were really in the cross hair of the investigation, 
but there was all sorts of people who were involved in this.  We had a whole series of issues 
dealing with the intelligence community and you know what our capability was while being able 
to asses the damage that occurred to the vehicle did we use any of that capability, we did not, 
why did we not, how were we going to in the future, there was just a whole host of activities that 
took place regarding intelligence.  A lot of the data gathering equipment and processes and 
procedures the federal government had that were not used, but now will be used in ongoing 
flights so you know when you see them up there taking pictures of themselves there’s other stuff 
that you need in order to ensure the safety of the crew.  So all kinds of different things. 
 
What was your involvement with the media following Columbia? 
How did the media treat NASA? 
 
You know it was intended…within a week of the accident Time Magazine called for the 
suspension of any human space flight if that were to be true we would not be flying the shuttle 
today. We had the New York Times and the Washington Post in investigative mode, you know 
trying to find who this guilty party was and trying to hang them out to dry. We were very 
focused on wanting to give adequate protection to our employees from these signs of inquiry but 
you had a delicate dance because at the same time we did not want to prevent our employees 
from communicating with the media, at the same time there are rules on how and what we can 
release to the media.  Around paper and public records requests.  We had a number of different 
factors in dealing with the media.  We had some employees that wanted to talk, some employees 
that didn’t want to talk and all kinds of records, email traffic, all kinds of stuff the media wanted 
so in the course of that we were managing all those kinds of moving parts and so for example 
when people were talking to the media we were trying to talk to them so at least we had an 
awareness of what they were saying because as soon as they said something we were then going 
to be asked by the media to comment on it so what I wanted us to be able to do was to track the 
communications, not prevent it, but track the communications so we would be aware of it and 
Sean wouldn’t be blindsided by someone sticking a mic in his face and saying Joe Schmoe 
said…then we are flat footed  sitting there trying to answer the questions.  Then we had people 
who wanted to talk to the media like Linda Hamm who I wanted to make sure they weren’t going 
to get blasted so I went down and talked to her ahead of her planned visit which she insisted on 
doing because she was under a lot of scrutiny, people were making a lot of accusations, she 
wanted to defend herself.  So my point was let’s practice you defending yourself and I did this 
with a number of employees, let’s practice you defending yourself and let’s make sure you do a 
good job of it.  So I asked some extremely hard questions of these folks before they ever got in 
front of the media to give them a case of what they might expect because when you get in front 
of the glare of the camera and the emotions and the anxiety you know you may say things that 




twenty-four hours later and have a superb answer and I didn’t want all of those anxieties from 
prohibiting those people to answer those questions well so I practiced with them and we did a lot 
of that.  And to some extent people were able to articulate better and to another extent they 
articulated to the same extent they were going to articulate day in and day out so we did a lot of 
that.  Then around the public records we took the positions that we were not going to exercise 
our right as an agency to withhold any documents except for personal information.  So we made 
huge releases of data and email traffic, I mean we did not seek any protection on that. There was 
only one area and we actually got into a whole question of interestingly enough executive 
privilege and that was around statements that were made pursuant to the investigation where 
individuals were told when they made the statement that they would be made in confidence so 
that we would be able to have them speak freely about their coworkers or about their superiors 
and got to a point where Congress wanted that to be disclosed and we refused to disclose that.  
That was the only thing I think that we ever refused to disclose, everything else was fair game in 
fact one of the things we did because we were getting inquiries from so many different people 
and then inquiries were going to Houston, to Florida and we couldn’t keep track of them at the 
Washington office and as a consequence once again we’d be surprised so we set up a very 
sophisticated process to manage the flow of information and what we did was anything that was 
produced was put on the Web, not only did we produce documents pursuant to FOIA requests 
but we posted everything to the Web.  The transparency was pretty high…yeah there was a lot on 
there.  I guess there’s still a bit on there.  Our position was if anybody asked for it and even if 
they didn’t ask for it we were gonna put it up there.  We thought if it was material we were 
gonna put it on the Web.  So you know I think and I’ll go back, I’m sure if you talked to Sean 
you’ll hear him say what Reedy said and what we said on the day of the accident was we were 
gonna tell the truth, tell it all and tell it now.  And that was our mantra, we were gonna be as 
transparent as we possibly could be, except in that one case where we took the confidential 
statements, but by the same token I’ve been around the block long enough to know I’ve been a 
lawyer long enough to know that people say things that they don’t mean when they’re surprised 
and under anxiety and I tried quite a bit to prepare people for that.  But I also interviewed people 
who had talked to the media.  There was one guy who was pointing a lot of fingers and the other 
thing I do was I try to go interview people who had gone to the interview who said things to the 
media which I found incomprehensible or perhaps incorrect and I wanted to go find out about it 
myself because we would have to deal with the consequences of behavior associated with some 
of these accusations that were being made, we may have to fire somebody.  So long story short in 
a number of cases we had people go and interview them after they had spoken to the media, find 
out exactly what they mean by this, that and nothing.  And actually in some cases I went out and 
did it myself due the nature of some of these accusations.  So that’s the kind of stuff that I did. 
 
How do you feel that your communication worked?  Did that turned out well?  Did NASA 
prosper by having an open and honest relationship with the public and the media? 
 
I think that our decision to be as open, as direct and as honest as we possibly could was 
absolutely the best thing that we could do and if you compare it to after Challenger you know we 
enjoyed a benefit by the way we handled it.  I think we were given a lot more latitude.  I think 
when we said things to people they believed us because we were as transparent as we were.  You 
can tell people the truth if they begin to be suspect of whether you’re telling them the truth you 




Challenger we made a very specific, conscious decision not to repeat that.  We put a guy on TV 
that Saturday afternoon for two and a half hours and let people, you know he was a technical 
guy, and let people…we said were gonna put a technical guy on TV and let people ask him 
questions until they stopped asking him questions and he did and it was probably the best thing 
that could happen.  Now he made, we had a number of other policies around communications we 
would not authorize, nor would we allow anybody to speculate as to what the cause of the 
accident was and this fella kind of blew us up.  We were doing good I think in the media for 
about six days until he made his decision that we were going to hypothesize as to what did not 
cause the accident and of course you know that story.  You know as a result we lost a lot of 
credibility and we violated one of our rules in order…you can’t in a situation like this go out and 
defend your agency.  Especially when there’s an investigation going on there’s all kinds of 
people…no one is going to believe you when you say it’s not your fault and you know.  Not only 
did people not believe us when we said it was not our fault they weren’t justified in believing us 
because we were at fault.  So that was a huge mistake and our mistake was that we weren’t able 
to mange that.  But you know people make mistakes and then you have to deal with the 
consequences of that and we did you know that was a whole, another issues, how do you deal 
with it when people make mistakes?  We then spent three weeks trying to undo that.  But we did 
and I think we got people back focused on the fact that we weren’t going to try to absolve 
ourselves from this, Sean had to go to committee hearings and when we did the committee 
hearing ten days or two weeks later after the accident and a few days after this guy did that faux 
pas you know Sean handled it in a way that was very direct and very firm.  A lot of people asked 
him to speculate, he kinda speculated on some things, which he later regretted.  There was the 
famous comment, about the foam would have the same effect on the shuttle as a Styrofoam ice 
chest would have hitting your car while your car was traveling sixty miles an hour.  That was a 
faux pas on his part, one technical person told him that and of course the implication was that the 
foam couldn’t have done much damage to the wing so he fell in the same trap that we were 
trying to prevent others from falling into.  But you know we recovered from that but he had to 
answer a lot of questions following that about that statement.  So the lesson learned in all of this 
is that when you’re involved in a disaster of any kind you do not speculate on what the cause of 
the accident is but rather you communicate around what the facts are and express you know your 
willingness to accept the findings of the independent third party investigator whatever they may 
hold and more importantly we are going to follow the recommendations, come what may and 
that was another whole big issue when the recommendations came back down.  Would we follow 
them sight unseen?  There were a lot of people within the agency that didn’t want to, but we 
ultimately decided that we would follow the recommendations sight unseen and you know 
people believe that if we did that we might never fly again because people weren’t actually sure 
that we could meet the recommendations but in the end we were not only able to meet the 
recommendations but we were able to surpass the recommendations. 
 
Interview with Glenn Mahone 
(Phone interview, March 27, 2008) 
 





I actually had a couple of positions, but I will give you the one that was the most recent and that 
was Chief of Strategic Communications and Assistant Administrator for Public Affairs.  I kind of 
had a dual role and I was also the press secretary for the agency.   
 
What brought you to NASA?  Why/how did you begin working there?  When did you first start 
your career with them? 
 
I was actually a political appointee, appointed by President Clinton to go to the US Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission and while I was there I was the chief spokesperson and 
senior advisor to the chairwoman who at that time was Ida Castro.  And I had been there for 
about eight months I guess and there were some specific problems in the press area at NASA and 
the people in the White House personnel actually asked me if I would go over and see if I could 
help that situation out. 
 
What kinds of problems were going on that required you to go over to NASA? 
 
It just wasn’t a good press operation going on at that time. 
 
So when did you arrive at NASA? 
 
I moved there in I would say April of 2000. 
 
When you were at NASA what were your kind of day-to-day duties or activities? 
 
Well I was press secretary, so when press inquiries came in they came to me, certainly those that 
related to the administrator.  I also did speech writing for the administrator and I also traveled 
with the administrator and press people generally will do that.   
 
On the day of Columbia, were you with O’Keefe that day? 
 
I am normally but that was the first landing that I was not scheduled to go down to, I actually 
took myself off of the plane and the reason why is because the following Monday we were going 
to have a budget rollout and I actually sent my assistant down in my behalf because later that 
afternoon Sean was coming back to Washington to go through a rehearsal of the budget press 
conference.  So I had decided to stay here and plan for that, I generally put those together.  So I 
decided to stay and it was just interesting that on that particular following Monday, a Monday 
following a landing so I just chose to stay here in Washington. 
 
Since you weren’t there at the time, how did you find out about Columbia? 
 
Our crisis communication plan calls for my notification immediately no matter where I was, 
whether I was with the administrator or whether I was in Washington or Russia or wherever.  
Part of our crisis communications plan was to notify me and then generally I would have notified 
the administrator had I been with him but what happened was I was notified through our plan.  





How did you fit into the crisis communication plan?  Why do you think it is important to have a 
plan? 
 
Well I was the person who had the responsibility for of course determining how, when and if we 
talked with the media, press conferences and all of those.  It was my decision based on how and 
when we would have information and when we would be prepared to put that information out to 
the general public and what statements would be made.  I played a role and a major role in 
writing the statements and moderating the press conferences and so forth, determining how long 
they would go, what questions we would take and what questions we would answer and at what 
time.  And the crisis communication plan is just a very integral part of any crisis.  You have to 
have a plan; you can’t go into it blind.  It’s very important that you sit back and you plan ahead 
for any eventuality whether that be a catastrophic accident like Columbia was or a pileage lying 
in a test plane or whether that’s an explosion or the International Space Station falls from the sky 
or any of those things.   
 
After Challenger there was not a good plan for dealing with the crisis, how was that problem 
identified and what was done to fix it? 
 
I think I can attribute it to, the problems that they had dealing with Challenger, but I also think it 
helped us in that we saw the mistakes that were made with Challenger and that we were not in a 
position to want to let that happen again.   
 




And how did that process go? 
 
Well there was one that was together and you really had to update it constantly.  There was a 
skeletal plan and what I did was pull a team together and we sat back and improved on what we 
had and that was a constantly.  You always try to update, upgrade based on anything that you 
think might very well be a crisis.  And you role-play with it and you have practices and so forth 
and you work it and that’s exactly what we did.  And we made sure that people had it, that’s the 
most important thing, you know you have to have it out there to the people who would play a 
role in it so that they wouldn’t make mistakes. 
 
How did you reach everyone that you needed to speak with especially those internal audiences? 
 
It was through the plan, and at that time all of the centers basically reported up to headquarters so 
there were constant telecoms and video teleconferencing and so forth to discuss issues and of 
course one of those issues would have been the crisis communication plan.  So it’s staying in 
touch, but when you have one person who has the overall responsibility and the tentacles are 
reaching out from there it makes all the difference in the world.  I mean there has to be someone 
in charge and there has to be lines of communication that are set up so that even if that person is 





Does NASA as a public sector organization differ in its crisis communication strategies from 
private sector organizations? 
 
Well we were responsible for notification to both the administration as well as to our 
congressional oversight committees and so forth so they were a part of it too in terms of making 
sure they were notified, making sure they knew what was going on because they had 
constituencies that they had to talk with so there was a component built in for notification to 
them so that they could have the information that they needed to be effective with their 
constituencies.  And of course we wanted to let them know and keep them informed you know 
just from a standpoint that they needed to know. 
 
So is there a difference in the way a public sector organization and a private sector organization 
must communicate? 
 
Oh absolutely.  Private sector organizations can give you what they want to a governmental 
organization basically, I mean there’s freedom of information and it’s best to get that information 
out there because the public has the right to know, they pay for it. 
 
Looking back at the situation now, is there anything that you would have done differently or did 
sticking to the plan really work? 
 
 I think we stuck to the plan.  There were times that we probably gave out more information than 
we had to, but I think we benefited from that.  We were having press conferences every couple of 
days, keeping the media informed so that they could keep their readers informed.  Because of 
what we dealt with, see we didn’t just deal with a space craft blowing up we lost people, and so 
when you look at the people element you know you have to be very, very careful you know 
because there are families and so forth so you have to be careful that way. 
 
What about dealing with the media?  What was the relationship like between NASA and the 
media at the time? 
 
I think that we probably had the best operation going and some of the best media partners that we 
could have asked for.  We were an open organization and that’s what I tried to do.  When Sean 
first came in I tried to make sure that we built some very, very strong camaraderie’s and let them 
know that they could trust us and that we were not going to keep things from them as much as 
we could keep things from them and I think that that made a difference, I think that the entire 
relationship that we had with the great majority of the media during that time was just great.  
They respected us and they like the way we did the job with them.  We were open with them, 
that’s the big kahuna.  We were getting the information out.   
 
Can you walk me through the day of Columbia, how you followed the plan? 
 
I was actually not at headquarters, it was still a little early, I was actually at home and I received 
a telephone call on my cell phone and was informed that we had a situation and I don’t 
remember the exact words and that I needed to come in.  Of course I started asking the questions 




that I needed to prepare something for the administrator to say.  So I at about eighty five miles an 
hour drove from my home to NASA headquarters and got there and started preparing a comment 
or a speech for Sean, finished the speech and what happened was we couldn’t find the 
appropriate fax machine to send it to, in fact we sent it to two or three and for some reason it just 
didn’t get to them so I think Sean and Paul based on my conversation with them via phone kind 
of put together a speech and Paul kind of spearheaded that activity and Sean actually went out 
and read it after the, after we knew that Columbia was lost.  Then I pulled together the team back 
here in Washington from a communications standpoint and we had also notified everyone that 
was a part of the crisis communications team, not just communications portion, but then the 
agency portion as well.  And then we went into what I called our war room and we sat and 
started disseminating information, started looking at information and at that point started 
deciding what we were going to put out when Sean returned to Washington and go from that 
point.  And while remembering that we had a budget rollout that we were going to do the next 
day also. 
 
Did that still go on as planned? 
 
I think we cancelled it for a couple of days but it was done within that week.  And it makes all 
the difference you know in the world.  You know you still have to go ahead and do you work.  
Because of an activity like that, you still have an agency to run, we still had International Space 
Station up there, so we still had a lot to do.   
 
Interview with Jennifer Wood 
(Phone interview, April 3, 2008) 
 
How did you get to NASA?  What made you want to work at NASA? 
 
I’ve always been passionate about human space flight and astronomy for that fact.  Growing up 
most girls favorite movie wasn’t my favorite movie which was “The Right Stuff,” so I’ve always 
been a bit of a space geek so I never really thought of, even though I wanted to do 
communications my whole life, I never really thought of having the opportunity to do it at 
NASA and I was in the White House Office of Management and Budget and knew Sean 
O’Keefe, he was our Deputy Director at the time, and obviously when he got nominated I started 
bugging him. I was definitely enjoying my time at OMB but I considered it a once in a lifetime 
opportunity to be able to go and work at NASA.   
 
What were your day-to-day duties?  What did your job entail?  What was your title or position 
that you held? 
 
Well I actually held a few titles while I was there, but my initial title was Senior Advisor to the 
Head of Public Affairs, Glenn Mahone.  Basically served as his right hand person, served as his 
back up, he was also at the time the press secretary, he was holding dual roles so I would serve as 
his back up for any interviews that our senior staff including the administrator would participate 
in and then basically you know help him with strategic planning as far as communications and it 
really almost changed day to day what I was involved in.  After Columbia you know when the 




that internal communications was obviously a weak spot for the agency at the time Glenn and 
Sean O’Keefe asked me to develop an internal communications office there at headquarters so 
my position changed at that time and I became the Supervisor Public Affairs Officer, but my 
informal title was internal communications manager so I hired a staff, created a budget and we 
started trying to figure out different mediums and communications vehicles to really help 
increase the internal communications there with the agency.   
 
While we’re talking about internal communications, could you go a little further and describe 
some of those vehicles? 
 
Sure, we did a survey and tried to look at the different ways the agency was currently trying to 
communicate, you know both horizontally and vertically and what was being effective and what 
obviously wasn’t being effective and we came to the conclusion that there was a couple of 
changes that we wanted to make right away.  There had been an employee newsletter that went 
around and each NASA center, as I’m sure you’re aware there’s ten and then headquarters makes 
eleven, each NASA center had its own newsletter, the headquarters newsletter was very 
headquarters-centric and it wasn’t going out to the different centers, so that was the first thing we 
wanted to change.  We wanted to make it more an overall agency document so it would serve 
dual roles.  Not only would it be an exciting document for all our employees to see the great 
work that was happening throughout the agency instead of just at headquarters.  It allowed 
employees to get involved and see what was going on and see their face even though they might 
be out at JSC or JPS they were in a headquarters publication that was going out to all the centers 
so everyone kind of got an idea of what everyone else was working on, which was a new concept 
for us.  There wasn’t really any kind of document that was doing that.  And so we also started 
sending it up to the Hill because it was a great way for us to be able to show our members of 
Congress exactly what the NASA funding was going toward, the great science, the great research 
and how it really was beneficial to continue to invest in this amazing agency.  We also did things 
like put flat-screen TVs at the elevators and ran slides that flashed across that were vibrant, 
things of that nature to let people know what was going on, whether it be about a blood-drive or 
safety training or things of that nature to try to make it more interactive.   
 
Did those things change the internal communications or the internal environment of the agency? 
 
I think it was a start.  Unfortunately after I got the office set up and got all the guidelines into 
place about the different mediums and communications vehicles I left shortly after because my 
home state senator, I’m originally from Texas, so my home state senator called and said I’m 
desperate for a press secretary so it was hard to turn her down.   
 
After speaking with Glenn Mahone I know that he was not in Florida, but sent you in his place.  
Can you tell me about your experience with Columbia and what that day was like for you?  Did 
you immediately begin using the crisis plan? 
 
Well obviously it was a very sad time for us as an agency and as a nation.  It’s defiantly one of 
the things that will be with me for the rest of my life that experience, and you know it was life 
changing.  That was going to be my first landing, I’d been to several launches, but had yet to be 




had been doing I was just I couldn’t wait, I was thrilled to be going.  And as serving as Glenn’s 
proxy for the administrator as well as other senior officials it seemed like a natural fit that I 
would go down.  So I traveled with the administrator down and everything seemed fine that 
morning.  I remember leaving the hotel and getting on the bus and hearing the update you know 
saying they were doing the orbit burn and everything was looking great, was very excited.  Went 
out to the pad, or the sorry not the pad but the runway, the tarmac and had just finished walking 
over to the reporters.  Talked to Mike Cabbage, I remember specifically from at the time he 
worked for the Orlando Sentinel and said obviously this has been a great mission, we’re looking 
forward to a great conclusion, we’ll bring over the administrator shortly after they land so you 
can kind of get an in-person debrief and share some of the excitement and the news from the 
mission.  About the time I started walking over, back to the administrator and Bill Reedy, we 
started to kind of figure out that something was wrong.  The clock was winding down and we 
hadn’t heard a, you know the two sonic booms, so we were starting to get a little bit nervous, but 
I don’t think anyone really fathomed that that could have actually had an accident at that time.  
Walked over, it was all kind of surreal at that minute, Bill walked away, the clocked ticked down 
to zero and then started going negative numbers everyone just kind of knew in our group.  Bill 
Reedy came back informed us he had heard from JSC (Johnson Space Center).  I think the first 
that I remember after that was the families were gathered up and put on a bus at the same time 
we were.  Took the administrator back to the head KSC (Kennedy Space Center) building there 
where the regional administrator’s office is and the plan was immediately put into action, our 
crisis communication plan.  After I knew that things were squared away with the administrator 
O’Keefe I left and went back to the main press office building to see how I could help them 
directly.  I remember working on the first draft of the press release, we talked about how our first 
priority was obviously search and rescue.  I remember making a call to one of my friends, 
Rebecca Davis who was at the time dating the press secretary, Ari Fleischer, I wanted to see if 
Ari was aware of the situation you know if he knew the status of the vehicle and what we were 
currently involved in, found out that they were both on vacation and so he directed me to call 
Scott McClellan who was the deputy press secretary at the time at the White House.  So made 
sure that he was aware of what was going on and continued to work on that first draft and really 
we just went down the checklist which obviously Glenn was immediately involved as soon as we 
started implementing the plan.  I remember there was then obviously a call with the President 
and the families.  I remember working on remarks with Sean for his address that came later that 
afternoon and then obviously the moment we found out that it wasn’t really a rescue mission it 
was a recovery mission.  I don’t remember very much after Sean went on-air that late afternoon 
or evening.  I know we were there until late into the night, I think we flew back in the wee hours 
of the morning.  But then obviously the next two weeks were just, everyone working twenty-four 
seven to find out you know how to prevent something like this from happening again, to make 
sure we were being as open and forthright with the media as we could be, there was daily 
briefings, I mean it was just an all out effort.  Which I think you know there was obviously press 
accounts that shed, you know it was night and day between Challenger and Columbia as far as 
the media relations effort to make sure this was open for all the public to know what the situation 
was and as we found out they found out.  So I do think it was, I think it was an event that showed 
that the agency had learned from its prior mistakes, obviously with space flight being human 
space flight, space flight in general being inherently dangerous because of the situation, I think 




action and made a new plan that was better and that really helped the nation, especially in this 
twenty-four seven world know what was going on.   
 
Was the crisis plan followed as written?  Were there changes that had to be implemented?   
 
From what I can remember the plan was stuck to pretty closely, fairly closely and I don’t 
remember deviating off the plan that much.  I think there was some adjustments, but I don’t think 
they were that major that I can even remember.  I do know that there was obviously a review 
again of the plan after there had a been a conclusion in the Columbia Accident Investigation 
Report after it had come out and I think there were small tweaks made here and there, but overall 
I think the plan is very good.  In fact the plan is so good that I really would consider it a good 
base for any organization, let alone a government agency, to be able to use and adapt to fit their 
particular needs.  I do think it was effective.  It’s never easy in a situation like that, whether it be 
a regional issue for some organizations or it’s a national or actually international you know 
emergency like it was for us at NASA, I think they did work on the plan enough and turned it 
into a god document to where it was useful for all, for people at NASA, the entire federal 
government, and then obviously the public at large. 
 
Why do you think it is so important to have a plan in place? 
 
The fact is, it doesn’t matter how safe one’s workplace may be or think it is.  If you’re just going 
in day in and day out things can always happen, you hear about it everyday, someone goes into 
an office building or a grocery store and a mass gunman, you heard about last year with the mall 
issue.  The fact is, no one should be without a crisis communications plan because we live in a 
world and day and age that warrants it.  I mean there really is no excuse for not having one in my 
opinion.  It’s one of the first things I ask of specifically when I go in for a job interview, because 
if they don’t have one I want to be somebody working on it.  I want to help that company be 
prepared, or that organization be prepared or that agency be prepared.   
 
Can you describe your involvement with the media in the days and weeks that followed? 
 
Well I wasn’t a spokesman for the agency, in my previous jobs before then I had been, but my 
role was more of an advisor so I worked with the media, but more off the record at NASA.  So 
really I just tried to serve as a resource and I think as any good reporter should be they’re 
continually ravenous for knowledge and so that’s what we did, we did our best to help them have 
all the information that was possible to give as we learned it and I think there may have been 
slight a few moments of frustration with the agency but you know I think they saw at the end of 
every day we were doing our best to get them the information and because of that I think they 
respected us as a team, respected our plan and kept a good relationship with the agency after.  
 
Why do you think it’s important to have open communications? 
 
Well especially at a federal agency I think it’s imperative, in my opinion it’s imperative 
everywhere, but especially at a federal agency, those are your tax dollars at work and you 
deserve to know what’s going on.  At NASA we are using the taxpayers dollars to achieve great 




learning from Sprit and Opportunity.  I think that it just goes to show that you know especially 
for the federal government that people have a right to know and the media has a right to know 
and the right to properly inform the public and I think that’s something that people sometimes 
you know take for granted is if you’re willing to work with the media you’re going to get a better 
story anyway and a more accurate story and that’s what matters at the end of the day.  I mean 
regardless of what the opinion an individual or a tone that an individual or group might take in 
the piece all that matters is the accuracy, really and truly.  And so the more willing you are to 
work with them the more accurate the story will be most likely and that’s better for the public.   
 
Do public sector organizations like NASA face different challenges than private sector 
organizations? 
 
I do.  I think obviously that no matter what organization, what type of organization you are you 
should conduct yourself, your business manners most forthright and truthful manner that you 
can, but I do think that federal agencies are held to special standards but at the same time I agree 
with that.  As a taxpayer myself I believe that that is their obligation, to truly be open, honest, 
forthright, let us know what’s going on and that way we can determine if changes need to be 
made and that might mean, it doesn’t always have to be a negative change, it could mean more 
investment in that agency if they’re doing a great job and it’s leading to wonderful benefits for 
our nation or in NASA’s case mankind.   
 
Interview with Bob Jacobs 
(In-person interview, April 7, 2008) 
 
Name, position at NASA 
 
My name is Bob Jacobs.  I am Deputy Assistant Administrator for Public Affairs here at NASA 
Headquarters.  At the time of the accident I was News and Multimedia Director. 
 
What bought you to NASA?  When did you come to NASA? 
 
I joined NASA in July of 2000.  I was working at Associated Press as a project manager in the 
broadcast technology division and like a lot of people here had always had a fascination with 
space and NASA.  I grew up with the Apollo program and when I had the chance to join the 
agency as news chief, I jumped at it. 
 
What were your day to day duties related to your job? 
 
Well then and now are different.  As a deputy assistant administrator I’m responsible for the 
overall day-to-day operations of the Office of Public Affairs so that does entail news and NASA 
television and the website, but it also entails guest operation, protocol, FOIA, public inquiries, a 
lot of other responsibilities.  At the time I was Director of News and Multimedia, which meant 
that I did more of ground-level supervision of the agency’s news and information operation and 
was more hands-on involving NASA television.  And we were actually in the midst of rolling out 
a new design for the NASA website, in fact it did roll out on February 1st, the day of the 





What was the day of Columbia like for you?  How did that day go?  How did you find out about 
the accident? 
 
What was interesting about it, and I can remember having a very specific conversation with our 
news chief, Doc Mirelson, Robert Mirelson, and Doc was talking about whether or not to come 
in that day, because it was on a Sunday, so it was the weekend.  And because I had said we could 
monitor this from home, from between computers and NASA television and briefing that we 
could do this and Doc was like, well I’ll probably come in anyway.  And the reason why a lot of 
us weren’t coming in was because we were coming in…later on that next Monday we were 
supposed to roll out the fiscal year ’04 budget, and those budget rollouts are big affairs and 
require a lot of resources.  So we were actually coming in that day to do a rehears, a dry run of 
the event and to go over the Qs and As associated with that budget.  So a lot of us were on the 
road, for example, I was on the interstate coming in from Fairfax at the time of the accident and 
Doc Merilson was here in the building, in the newsroom at that and he called me.  I can’t 
remember times or anything like that, but I was driving in, had literally just left the exit and had 
gotten on the interstate and the phone rang and Doc told me that we had lost contact with the 
orbiter.  And immediately no one really, it hadn’t registered in anyone’s that accident, you know 
as the information, from mission control up it dealt very factually.  At the time we just lost 
control with Columbia and that didn’t really mean anything, but he called about ten minutes later 
and said they still hadn’t heard from the crew, hadn’t heard from the orbiter.  So we went ahead 
and, we like most organizations have a contingency plan, a very comprehensive contingency 
plan.  So after the second phone call we just started putting the plan into action, started calling 
people in, getting everyone into the building.  You know of course by the time we got here it was 
clear the scope of what had happened. 
 
What was the rest of the day like?  Did you follow the contingency plan? 
 
We started, of course there’s a, you know the slang name for it’s a “war room” but it’s the 
Emergency Operations Center is opened on the seventh floor and that’s where space operations 
is located, where the space shuttle program’s located and it’s a room with telephone banks and 
communications capabilities.  It’s much more robust now, but it was still reasonably robust then 
and it puts us in contact with all the space operation centers associated with…it has direct link 
ups.  So once the contingency is declared, once there’s an issue, of course JSC (Johnson Space 
Center) locks down the room which means that they close off all communications, all the 
information’s frozen, it’s like a giant snapshot has been taken at that time and nothing gets to 
leave and nothing changes.  And as part of the contingency plan, the Deputy Administrator of 
NASA Fred Gregory was here at headquarters and started notifying the members of the accident 
board.  Those members are selected prior to each mission and agree to serve on a panel in the 
event that there is an accident.  Now one difference to that plan was that Sean O’Keefe, the 
administrator at the time, went outside and asked for Admiral Gehman to serve as the head of 
this panel.  So those calls were being made for the agency.  For us, communications wise, it was 
literally finding out what factual information we could release and as quickly as we could do it.  
We immediately put up a notification on the Web page and said a contingency had been 
declared.  And as factual information came out we updated the Website and started working on 




goal to be on the air with our first remarks within an hour after whatever the incident was, and I 
believe we were actually two and a half hours later because what happened was after we notified 
the White House and everything…of course everyone has specific roles as you’ve seen if you’ve 
read the contingency plan.  So once the White House was notified then the decision was made 
for NASA not to say anything until after the President was to make remarks.  So as soon as the 
President made his remarks we were prepared to hold our first news conference down at the 
Kennedy Space Center, you know at least stating what we knew.  For us it was very much the 
same, we set aside…the public affairs offices are located in the co-directorates anyway, but what 
we did was set aside part of the space operations center just as a public affairs area and we 
moved a number of public affairs officers over there.  Normally there are three in that office and 
I think we augmented it, I think we ramped up to seven or eight at headquarters alone.  We had 
phones installed, printers installed, basically a giant work area where we could start dealing with 
the volume of phone calls we were getting.  And we just responded, releasing what information 
we could, as best we could, as quickly as we could.  It was an on going process.  I think most 
everyone was here at least 17 to 20 hours the first day; I don’t remember what time I left.  I do 
remember…just overarching facts and figures, most people are here it was about 21 days before 
they took a day off and most of the days in the early days and weeks that followed were easily 15 
or 20 hour days.  I mean you just came in first thing in the morning and picked up where you left 
off and just worked until the evening news cycles…we were doing multiple, the administrator 
was doing multiple live shots.  One of the issues that we face was that we knew that we just had 
to create a machine to just keep providing as much information as we could at a predictable time.  
One of the things that can make a crisis frustrating for reporters is getting and update, but not 
knowing when that update will come, so they keep calling you to find out when the next update 
is coming and given that this was a worldwide event we wanted to at least be able to drive 
reporters to predictable times at which they could get the latest information.  Now they could still 
call and we would provide for them whatever we had at the time…we were all doing radio 
interviews over the phone and that sort of thing, but we made a commitment to do two news 
briefings a day until the Columbia Accident Investigation Board was up and operating, until we 
officially handed over the investigation to the CAIB.  So we were doing a briefing first thing in 
the morning from here at headquarters which was hosted by General Michael Kostelnik, who 
was head of the Space Shuttle and International Space Station programs at the time and the 
afternoon briefings were hosted at the Johnson Space Center on a more technical level, generally 
with Ron Dittemore who was the Space Shuttle Program Manager at the time.  And we did that 
for the first several days, I want to say it went four or five days before the Columbia Accident 
Investigation Board took over.  Now once that took over, once the CAIB took over we stopped 
those briefings because it was no longer a NASA investigation.  You know we dealt with factual 
issues having to do with recovery, memorial services, return of the remains from the accident site 
to Dover, so there was no real curtailment in the news operations, but it shifted a little bit in that 
we weren’t getting into you know potential causes or issues or information.  One thing that 
helped us tremendously was that the administrator, Sean O’Keefe at the time, made a flat out 
determination that anything up until the accident, anything factual that we could release up until 
the accident would be released immediately, without a lot of editing, without a lot of…in fact we 
even set up what we called a rapid response team…CARRT Columbia Accident Rapid Response 
Team and what we did was looked at, because at that time it was just a flood of FOIAs and what 
we did was examine what type of information, kind of looking at the FOIAs and knowing what 




associated with the mission we just released it.  We didn’t wait for FOIA, in fact we kind of 
made an attempt to supersede the FOIA process because FOIA in it of itself takes time and there 
wasn’t any.  So I mean we did a collection of all emails that were associated with the discussions 
that had to do with the foam strike when it was, when they started focusing on that and we just 
released them in mass.  And some of them, that’s where you found a lot of conversations that 
were going on about trying to raise the issue a little higher and it never went anywhere else.  So I 
believe we informed the discussion fairly quickly given that we were literally just pouring stuff 
out there, posting it on the Website, making it available through news briefings, but we made 
people available to speak with the media.  In Houston, people in Langley who expressed some 
concerns, because the email traffic mostly had dealt with, during the mission time frame the burn 
through in the wheel well because no one thought the foam strike was on the leading edge they 
thought it was all underneath the wing so the concern was, did it hit the panel that flies open, that 
blasted open right before it lands.  And they were worried that there would be a burn through and 
deflate the tire or burn through the wing that way.  And you know a blown tire on landing is, 
could be just as catastrophic as anything else so there was a lot of this kind of back and forth 
conversations with engineers and we just took all of this information and released it as early as 
we could.  In fact I remember one Congressional hearing, the Administrator took a lot of heat 
because the emails were released a day before this hearing and some members of Congress were 
very critical wanting to know if the Administrator had seen all this and of course he hadn’t.  And 
it was this double-edged sword because he had members of Congress stating how shouldn’t the 
Administrator know all this information before any of this stuff was released, how could you not.  
But at the same time you know Sean made the point of, my direction was to release the factual 
information as quickly as possible without me seeing it.  I’ll see it, but I don’t know that I should 
be in the process of getting in the way of whether or not this information is released, gets out.  So 
I don’t think that, it’d be interesting seeing how years from now communication professors deal 
with that, but that was, at least in terms of government and corporate management a very bold 
position to take because he just said that if there’s information out there, get it out there and that 
helped everything we did. 
 
Why do you think that was so important to him?  Why do some organizations not operate like 
that during a crisis? 
 
Well they should.  It’s interesting, I just completed a graduate program at Seton Hall University 
and we did crisis communication sections and we were studying Challenger and all the things 
that went wrong with the Challenger accident, not releasing information and things of that 
nature.  And I came to NASA from the news industry, as a journalist, so I come from an area, it’s 
funny I tell people I have three commandments when it comes to communications: first one is 
tell your own story, if you don’t tell your own story someone else will tell it for you, bad news 
doesn’t get better with age and tell your own bad news.  And if you look at the corporate 
communication missteps, take aside the scope of the tragedy that was involved in the event, if 
you look at the communication mistakes generally they can be laid at the feet of one of those 
three issues.  Either not telling your own bad news, not telling your own story or sitting on it for 
too long.  And these are basic communication tenants that are taught in most management 
schools and communication schools and for some reason people forget it when they get out in the 
real world.  So I’m sure it just had to do with Sean’s background, he was former Secretary of the 




door of the Navy with a huge public perception issue for the Navy.  So I never had a specific 
conversation with him about that, you know how did you get this, but it was clear that he did.  
And he was very specific, you couldn’t cross the line, you have to be careful when you’re being 
that open and that transparent, not to start crossing into lines where people are getting you to 
speculate about what may or may not have happened and that’s not what we were doing.  Their 
line was facts, and it was otherwise left up to the Columbia Accident Investigation Board, in fact 
in your research you may remember there was, Ron Dittemore caught some heat because in one 
of those early briefings he made some statement and said he did not see how the foam, it wasn’t 
that definitive but they brought out a piece of foam, and I think it weighed like a pound and made 
some statement about how, we as engineers don’t see how a piece of foam could have done that 
and Sean, we quickly pulled together a media roundtable with reporters not an hour or so after 
that briefing and Sean basically said appreciate the information and the insight but that goes a 
little further than what I as the Administrator am ready to go.  All things on the table as far as 
I’m concerned that is possible, it’s just as likely a target as anything else as a probable cause or a 
potential cause.  And at the end of the day he was proven to be correct.  So he was very sensitive 
to staying open to whatever the cause was.  He said the first day he was going to let the facts lead 
us to whatever the cause is and deal with it from that standpoint.  And he was also very upfront, 
he had a three tiered approach, we were gonna find the problem, fix it and fly again.  So when 
the troops hear that find it, fix it and fly and that he’s going to provide as much information as he 
could there isn’t really anywhere to go in terms of criticism of the communication approach as to 
what the agency was doing.  Some people were concerned that somehow we were gonna close 
doors once the Columbia Accident Investigation Board got started, but I think after the first 
couple of conferences of the CAIB, there was a lot of concern about its independence on the Hill, 
especially from Democrats on the Hill, but once it became clear that Admiral Gehman really was 
going to act independently a lot of those criticisms backed off.  But again I think that its open 
and transparent communications is important, Sean got it and exercised it and that’s whey the 
agency, at least in terms of a communication response standpoint, faired as well as it did 
publicly.   
 
Did you help create the plan? 
 
Well, there were a lot of people who worked on it.  I think anyone with any experience in 
communications doing a communications 101 exercise would be able to do it.  It had to do with, 
what it needed to get done, public notification, what would we do with the Website, what would 
we do with NASA television, a lot of it had to with what to do with guests since we had a lot of 
guests out there, how did you handle those guests, where do they go.  So it was truly an agency 
wide effort, it was signed off by eventually the Administrator, the AA my boss at the time Glenn 
Mahone, the head of human space flight who at the time was Bill Reedy, and eventually Sean 
O’Keefe.  It is something that we practice annually, we go through different scenarios and there 
is one for every mission and it really helped because we literally followed it page by page there 
in the first hours because…one of the things we had to get away from was that a lot of us knew 
the crew, we knew these people, they were colleagues, co-workers, some were very close 
friends.  I knew them, I wasn’t close friends with them, but I knew who they were.  So there was 
personal grieving on top of having to get the job done and having a thought out contingency plan 
helped focus on what needed to get done, you know it served as a checklist and you focused on 




things, and I’ve been involved in a number of emergency planning documents at television 
stations.  You know if you walk into a newspaper newsroom or a television news room one of 
the first things they’ll say, they’ll call it their plane crash plan because that’s probably the biggest 
thing that could happen in a breaking news situation is what happens if a passenger jet crashes 
and one of the things that I found in emergency planning is that they were very thoughtful and 
very exhaustive.  They have names associated with who’s going to do what and it was very 
detailed.  The flaw of that plan was that it was built upon the assumption that something 
happened at 2 o’clock on a Wednesday when everyone was there and most of the time the 
disasters happened at 2 o’clock AM on a Saturday on Christmas Eve when there’s no one there.  
So instead of getting bogged down in who is doing what, I think what helps, the way I approach 
our plans here and what I think would help other crisis communication planners is just focus on 
what needs to get done and let the people who are there at the time focus on how to accomplish 
it.  Because it’s very different when you’re sitting there saying, well I’m supposed to do this but 
these four people aren’t here, what do I do.  No, you focus on what needs to get done and just 
stay in constant communication.  We were doing multiple teleconferences each day with all the 
public affairs officers, we were organizing whatever the latest fact sheets were and making broad 
distributions, making sure everyone had the latest information and had the same information.  
We kind of divided the work, the field centers dealt with their regional media and as it changed 
or shifted, headquarters dealt with the majority of the network and the larger media, except for 
specific things that were accident…policy and investigation and big world stuff we were dealing 
with, a lot of the nuts and bolts stuff that were happening Johnson was still dealing with.  But the 
biggest thing is that you have to have people and you have to have a plan that outlines what it is 
that you are supposed to do and I think that the contingency plan that’s in the back of the space 
shuttle mission books are clear guidelines.  And things change, we did a lot of things that weren’t 
in the contingency plan.  For example, there isn’t anything in there that says…the contingency 
plan was built around the idea that we would have an issue at launch, it’s rare, you know 
hindsight’s 20/20 now, but no one ever considered having an issue on re-entry, you know you 
either have an issue at launch or you have an issue in space, no one ever thought there would be 
a problem coming down.  In hindsight that seems pretty silly thinking because you spend 8.5 
minutes going from 0 to 17,5000 miles an hour at some point you have to dissipate that energy, 
so it takes just as much technology and forethought to slow down from 17,500 miles an hour to 
about 230 miles an hour at landing.  So I think there were some fundamental shifts in the way in 
the way that we thought and in the way that we think, but we were having to deal with things 
like, there were hydrazine tanks that survived and fuel cells that survived re-entry and we were 
having to get notifications out to area media in Texas and Louisiana warning local residents not 
to touch any of the debris that they see and stay away from the tanks.  We set up a totally 
separate news operation out in Texas in Lufkin and that area of Texas for the recovery efforts. So 
there were a lot of things in there that we found we needed to do that weren’t covered in the 
contingency plan, but because the plan so clearly spelled out the things that we did need to do, it 
was easy to add on to it.  The one other caveat I want to add to someone putting together a 
contingency plan is try not to make it so detailed that it limits you, because you can do that.  
Someone or some group of people have such a specific role or such specific acts that need to get 
done that you won’t be able to respond and, oh look this has happened and we need to go right, 
but no the plan says we have to go left.  So it needs to be as specific as you can make it, but at 
the same time flexible enough as to allow for what they would call in the safety world the 




cause problems but not know to deal with it, but there are unknown unknowns which are things 
that we don’t know about that could cause problems and generally in a crisis often do. 
 
How does NASA as a public sector organization, an organization who is responsible to the 
public and to Congress differ in its response to a crisis as opposed to a private sector 
organization? 
 
Well it would be nice if it didn’t.  I think there are a lot of examples of corporate crisis 
communications of people doing it right.  I think Johnson and Johnson with the Tylenol scare is 
generally one that is held up.  Now it would be interesting to see how that would be handled 
today with the immediacy of the news coverage that didn’t exist then, even in the late 80s when 
that happened, but the agency in it of itself was built on a foundation of openness.  
Disseminating information to the widest audience practicable, I believe is the verbage that’s used 
in the original space act.  The agency was founded as a civilian space agency and all of its 
activities were going to be as open as possible, which was in direct opposition to the way at the 
time the Russian space program was being run which was largely a military operation, operated 
in secret.  So that culture just followed the agency throughout its history.  Most of the times, I 
think much more often than not, the agency’s been credited with being open and transparent.  I 
mean we show our triumphs and our tragedies live on television for everyone to see, so we try to 
be as open and transparent as possible.  Private industry is just a little different because they 
report to different, it depends on the job, you report to, the leadership may feel they report to 
shareholders or their own employees before they need to report to the general public and one of 
the first things that any corporate organization needs to identify is who are its stakeholders, who 
are the various people they need to communicate with when something goes wrong or even when 
something goes right.  Is it the shareholders, is it the general public, is it the employees and one 
of the things that you don’t want to do it leave the employees out because they are the ones that 
are going to help pull you through whatever that crisis is.  So you need to make them feel a part 
of the plan and that’s another element of a crisis plan that I don’t believe is really in our 
contingency plan, but we deal with keeping employees notified and having them involved in 
what’s going on as quickly as you can in terms of the overarching crisis communications 
process.  We’re probably one of the few government agencies who has openness and 
transparency written into its founding act and we believe it’s a fairly good model to follow. 
 
I’ve read literature that criticizes NASA’s internal communications, communications within the 
organization.  How do you feel about that criticism?  Is it accurate?  Is it hard to reach the 11 
sites? 
 
You’re right, I think that to this day that is an area that, you know I think that we…the standard 
line is that we always want to find ways to work better and we do, both internally and externally.  
But I do believe that internally there are some areas that we can improve, we’ve made great 
strides in taking into account when there are big announcements or things need to happen, you 
know how do we find the work force, we need to talk.  When I first got here they notified the 
workforce by the press release that went out to notify the media, so we’ve at least gotten to the 
point within the past five or 10 years where we’ve been taking into account the workforce and 
keeping them informed, if not before then at least at the same time as anyone else, and the 




resources dedicated to internal communications.  We do have an intranet, but it doesn’t have a lot 
of people working on it and the field centers tend to have their own internal communications 
operations.  So I believe would could do a better job of working under one global internal 
communications umbrella, but they do a pretty good job of keeping our workforce informed as it 
is. 
 
What was the involvement with the media like after Columbia? 
 
You know it’s interesting in having worked on the other side of the desk and through it there are 
phases that you go through and there is almost this, especially in the early hours, calling it a 
honeymoon period is a bit insensitive, but there is this compassionate period, goodwill, grace, 
compassionate period of about four or five days when you’re not getting the unanswerable 
questions, the how could NASA allow this tragedy to happen type stuff.  Everyone is so focused 
within those first few days with first just understanding the tragedy and getting their hands 
around what’s going on.  We had to coordinate with about 12-15,000 people in Lufkin and 20 
different agencies were helping us and trying to deal with the workforce and everyone else.  So 
you generally have a about a week when the media isn’t overtly critical when they’re not looking 
for holes in what you’re trying to present.  But after that initial wave of information goes and 
gets out there, then it starts to become a little more pointed, a little more critical, a little more 
news, the reporter actually just getting smarter frankly.  We have a core press, a press corps that 
follows us and we know those people and they know the shuttle program inside and out and they 
know the orbiter inside and out and a lot of them know it much better than I do, or better than a 
lot of the communications people do because they grew up with the orbiter, they breathe this 
specific program, this specific element.  But when you have an accident the scope of Columbia, 
you have all the reporters thrown at it and for the first couple of weeks you’re literally having to 
give pointy end goes up lessons to reporters who are trying to figure out how to disseminate this 
information to their audience.  So there’s an education process that goes on with the reporting 
core, and then once more data’s know, once more data’s released…and I think everyone pretty 
early started looking at the foam strike.  I don’t think there was anyone, even though the agency, 
you know we were going to let the facts lead us to what the cause issues were, no one could have 
seen that foam strike and how the mission ended and start adding one plus one and seeing if you 
could get to two.  So a lot of people were focusing on the foam strike and the discussion about it, 
a lot went on and that brought out a lot of the issues we had with that mission, such as not doing 
daily MMT, mission management team meetings, which was mandatory, on paper it was 
mandatory and we weren’t doing them.  Linda Ham took a lot of heat as a result of that.  The fact 
that most of our computer models were outdated and even the Columbia Accident Investigation 
Board criticized what I believed they called management by powerpoint in the report.  And that 
took us down to dig deeper as well because as the agency communicators we’re flying at 20 or 
30,000 feet knowing the overarching issues of management of the program but at the same time 
we have to dial down what did happen, what was supposed to happen, what information’s out 
there.  I think all of us came away with a much deeper and more specific understanding of the 
decision making process within STS or during STS-107 and what we do now as a result of that 
than we did going in.  But overall there is this period of education with the media trying to feed 
those who know the program really well as best you can and at the same time try to educate 
those who don’t cover NASA on a regular basis.  And there were hundreds up on hundreds of 




sounds not quite…but in some instances that’s literally what you’re doing.  It’s helping them 
understand not only the orbiter, how it works, but the basic management structure and how 
things were done during the mission and in government in general. 
 
Looking back on the day of Columbia, were there things that didn’t go as plan or thing that you 
would have changed? 
 
Communications wise…well I’ll fall back on that you can always do things better…and that the 
communications around Columbia did go well.  I think that some of the things that we learned 
had to do with…we have a very comprehensive and proven plan and it takes you all the way up 
to the point of the Columbia Accident Investigation Board taking over.  We didn’t have anything 
that had to do with how to support and deal with the CAIB.  We had to assign a public affairs 
officer who was going to provide television support, who’s going to deal with their news 
conference and we learned all of that on the fly.  So I think that expanding the contingency plan 
beyond launch, beyond mission activities I think is a valuable lesson for us and one that now 
those of us who have been through it kind of can anticipate and know what to do and maybe can 
do it a little easier.  Now it’s all transparent to the media and to the general public, there was a lot 
of behind-the-scenes teeth gnashing and running around and trying to figure out who was going 
to do what with this independent organization that wasn’t independent, but was independent and 
what kind of support could we do.  And we over thought all sorts of ethical issues, should we be 
issuing their news releases through our distribution system, on NASA letterhead?  Does that feed 
into the perception that they’re not as independent as they should be?  So we had really long and 
deep conversations about how to support them and that was an important lesson.  Overall I think 
the lesson for me to this day was that it reinforced my three commandments, if there’s an 
incident get out there and provide the facts, don’t spin…coming from the news industry, one of 
the hardest decisions a reporter has to make is when they have an opportunity to join an 
organization in communications do they do it, because they are seen by their colleagues, or soon 
to be former colleagues, as PR flacks and I’m not a PR flack.  I run NASA news and information 
organization very much like a newsroom.  It’s fact based; now I could be accused of advocacy 
journalism, but I would argue that most journalists are advocates.  The idea that there is 
objectivity in journalism is naive, especially in print where there’s no requirement to be, and 
even in television there’s no requirement to be although most people will argue that they are.  
Generally you’re an advocate for your publication’s position, its political leaning, you’re an 
advocate for the community, for your station, you’re an advocate for something.  So I will plead 
guilty to being an advocate for the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, but 
information wise this isn’t like running a contest for figuring out the new color for an M&M.  
We’re not going to do that type work, everything is based in science, its based in technology, it 
factually accurate and we make editorial decisions just like any news organization makes 
editorial decisions because our editorial processes are run by people who came from the news 
industry.  We try to make it as objective as we can and leadership has continued to support us.  
My job isn’t to sell anything, a lot of people think it’s my job to sell a program, we’ve got to sell 
Constellation or we’ve got to sell going to Mars, no we don’t.  Our job isn’t to sell anything, my 
job is to clean the windows, I see my job as trying to give the American people a clearer view 
into their space program and as long as I operate from that side of the aisle.  I don’t have a 




I’m having to sell something or pitch something that I walk away questioning whether or not this 
is the right thing to do and fortunately that hasn’t happened yet. 
 
The following comments were taken from conversations following the interview: 
 
He [Sean O’Keefe] was dealing with so many things with the investigation he just wanted the 
information out there and whatever facts were out there, whatever he said, and he was willing to 
let the chips fall and that’s rare in government and corporate communications where the initial 
reaction is to try to control it and spin it. 
 
One of my biggest points is that you have to start a flow of information both internally and 
externally.  You have to develop multiple paths of communications both in and out and then 
again focus on just releasing facts.  What did we know?  What could we confirm at that time? 
 
I do believe that, historically and in communications circles, the way the agency handled it will 
be held up as a good example, but I would give anything not to have had to demonstrate that we 
know how to do that.   
 
It starts with leadership and goes down.  If you’ve got a leader that says we’re going to be open 
and transparent then the rest of it takes care of itself.  What you don’t want to have to do is fight 
and bicker and beat people into doing what is right and our jobs were made much easier because 
Sean and the rest of the senior leadership just from moment one said this is how we’re going to 
work and it really helped. 
 
Interview with Michael Cabbage 
(Phone interview, April 28, 2008) 
 
Can you provide some background on your career as a journalist?  Had you always been 
assigned to stories about science or space? 
 
I lived in Northern California in the early 1990s and went back to graduate school for a Master’s 
degree in journalism and when I graduated in the spring of 1994 sort of by coincidence my wife 
had the opportunity to transfer with the company that she was working with and we looked at 
various locations.  I had the opportunity to get on with a newspaper and she had an opportunity 
with her job to go to work as well.  And when we put things side by side and looked at the 
opportunities that we had, and keeping in mind that we had two young children and were finding 
a good place for them to grow up we saw that both of us could go to work in Central Florida.  
There was an office that she could transfer to in Melbourne, Florida and there was a newspaper 
called Florida Today, the local newspaper of Brevard County and Cape Canaveral.  Cape 
Canaveral and the space program and Kennedy Space Center and NASA were things that I had 
been interested in since I was old enough to be aware of what was going on current events wise.  
I had been a space buff ever since I was six years old.  Immediately I was interested in doing that 
because of the possibility that I would get to write about space.  So to make a very long story 
short we made the move, I went to work at Florida Today in the summer of 1994.  I spent about 
a year doing various assignments; sort of a general assignment reporter at the bureau for a while 




probably early 1995.  In the mean time before that I’d actually begun covering space a little bit.  
Throughout the second half of 994 I’d covered expendable or unmanned rocket launches and had 
also helped out with the shuttle launches because that was always a really big deal.  They would 
put a lot of people together for those coverage teams when the shuttle was going to launch 
because it was something Florida Today typically had spent a lot of resources and a lot of space 
on.  So I continued working at Florida Today in ’95 on into ’96 and in ’96 I had an opportunity 
to work for the South Florida Sun Sentinel, which is a much larger newspaper, located in 
Broward County Florida, sort of the Ft. Lauderdale are between Miami and Palm Beach County.  
It circulates all through that area and covered Miami, circulated down there as well.  So it was a 
really terrific opportunity with the company Tribune, who was one of the better newspaper 
companies to work for.  I went down there and ended up covering science and hurricanes and 
covered a lot of NASA stuff then took a trip to Russia to cover a Ft. Lauderdale astronaut who 
was the head of the Russian program office over there and had flown a mission to the 
International Space Station.  When the space reporter at the Orlando Sentinel left to take a job 
here in Washington in the summer of 1998, the Orlando Sentinel was a sister paper, both owned 
by Tribune.  Because I had covered space before and knew some of the folks at the Orlando 
Sentinel knew me, they contacted me and said would you be interested in coming up here and 
replacing this reporter who has left on the space beat and I said sure, that’d be terrific because I 
enjoyed covering space full time and I enjoyed living in Central Florida.  That happened in the 
summer of 1998 and I covered space until May of 2007, for nine years at the Orlando Sentinel.  
Landed a job here at NASA Headquarters and went to work here the day after Memorial Day 
2007. 
 
Prior to Columbia, what was your involvement with NASA like?  Had they been open with 
information prior to Columbia? 
 
I thought that I knew NASA pretty well.  As a space reporter we covered lots of issues that 
related to NASA and I followed NASA pretty closely.  NASA, when compared to other 
government agencies, I thought always was pretty darn good.  They were relatively open and in 
fact one of the better government agencies about responding to media inquiries in a timely 
fashion, about making information available through the FOIA requests, about making officials 
accessible for interviews, things of that sort.  Even before I came to work here I thought they had 
a pretty good track record. 
 
What kind of contacts did you have within the agency?  Who were you most familiar with?  Who 
handled the media inquiries? 
 
Well the way that it worked, and the way that it still works is there’s NASA Headquarters, which 
is where I work and it is what the name implies, it’s the headquarters of the agency.  And then 
you have 10 different NASA field centers, which are located coast-to-coast, every place from the 
Kennedy Space Center in Florida, to Johnson Space Center in Houston, the Marshall Space 
Flight Center in Huntsville, Alabama, the Jet Propulsion Laboratory in Pasadena, California, and 
there is a public affairs operation here at NASA Headquarters in which the main mission 
directorates, for example the Space Operations Mission Directorate, which oversees the shuttle 
and space station programs and the Science Mission Directorate which oversees inter-planetary 




headquartered here and there are public affairs officers that are co-located in with them that help 
answer media queries that come to headquarters about those programs.  In addition to that at the 
NASA field centers there are also public affairs officers who are perhaps a little more specialized 
in what those centers do and the specific programs that are sort of headquartered there.  For 
example at the Marshall Space Flight Center, that’s where the external tank project office is, so if 
you have external tank questions then obviously Marshall is a great place to call.  Stennis Space 
Center near Bay St. Louis, Mississippi is where they test the rocket engines, so if you have a 
rocket engine testing question that’s a good place to call, or you can also call Marshall because 
that’s where they design the propulsion systems.  So to make a long story short, if you’re a 
reporter you interact with a lot of those different people at a lot of different centers.  Now also as 
you know, reporter will develop sources, which aren’t in the public affairs operation and are 
folks that you can call independently, at different field centers and throughout the agency.  But if 
you’re talking about the official points of contact for the agency that’s pretty much how it works. 
 
Assuming that you had been to landings before Columbia, how did those work?  Were there 
particular procedures?  How did you go about reporting those events? 
 
The procedure for covering a space shuttle landing before Columbia, and really it’s not changed 
much after Columbia, is there is a press site at the Kennedy Space Center…there are three 
landing sites for the space shuttle.  One is Kennedy Space Center in Florida which is always the 
primary preferred landing site because that’s where they process the orbiters for their next flight 
and it’s much more convenient, it saves time, it saves money if you can land in Florida instead of 
landing elsewhere and having to bring the orbiter back to Florida.  The transportation costs are 
things you want to avoid.  The secondary landing site is at the Edwards Air force Base in 
Southern California.  The third landing site, which is sort of a contingency landing site, if all else 
fails, if weather everywhere else is bad, is at the White Sands Missile Range in New Mexico and 
there’s only been one landing ever at White Sands and as far as Kennedy Space Center and 
Edwards are concerned don’t hold me to this, but I think historically since the beginning of the 
program, probably somewhere between 55 and 60% of flights have landed at Kennedy and 
probably somewhere between 40 and 45% have landed at Edwards.  In fact Edwards at the 
beginning of the program was the primary landing site.  So most reporters always would make 
their preparations to cover landings by going to the Kennedy Space Center.  There is a large 
contingency of reporters who report on the space shuttle program who are stationed in Florida 
near the Cape.  They typically didn’t travel to the other backup locations; they were there at the 
Cape.  Now typically how it worked on launch day, reporters would come in a couple of hours 
before the scheduled landing time or earlier depending on how closely you wanted to cover it 
and what you were covering it for: radio, television, print, Internet, whatever.  Before the orbit 
lands, there is a de-orbit burn which essentially is the engine firing that takes the shuttle out of 
orbit and starts the re-entry process.  That usually occurs roughly an hour before landing.  The 
way the process would work is that once the people at mission control in Houston had decided 
whether or not the weather conditions were acceptable for the shuttle to return to Earth, they 
would make a call for this revolution around the Earth.  If the observed conditions were good and 
the forecast conditions were good then they would give the go for the de-orbit burn and when 
they gave the call for the de-orbit burn the reporter typically would congregate down by these 
buses they would have at the press site at the Kennedy Space Center and which then would 




shuttle’s scheduled landing and would essentially wait there to see the landing.  There wouldn’t 
be a whole lot going on in the mean time, other than monitoring the shuttle progress on landing 
air to ground.  Satellite trucks would also convoy in and there would be a handful of 
photographers that would get there earlier also, but that was pretty much the way it would work. 
 
On the day of Columbia, how did that day go?  When did you realize something went wrong?  
What happened after that moment of realization? 
 
Well as far as the media procedures at the Kennedy Space Center were concerned it was exactly 
the way that it always had been.  There was the trickle of satellite trucks that went over, there 
were a few photographers who went over early.  Not a whole lot of people attended that landing 
from a media standpoint.  It was on a Saturday morning.  There didn’t seem to be a whole lot of 
media interest.  In fact if the first Israeli astronaut hadn’t been returning there might even have 
been less than there was.  It was the standard routine, they gave the call for de-orbit burn, the 
reporters who were there gathered around the buses.  As I recall the landing was around 9AM 
Eastern Time and we probably headed over the shuttle landing facility about 8AM.  One other 
thing that does stand out to me, and I wrote it in my book, is the fact that it was so foggy out that 
morning and it made me wonder whether or not the fog was gonna clear up enough to allow a 
shuttle landing on the first opportunity.  Typically there are a couple of orbits that the shuttle 
mechanics line up in a way that make it able to come back to Florida.  The first opportunity, it 
was uncertain whether the fog was gonna clear up enough to let them try for the first orbit, but it 
did.  We showed up an hour beforehand and waited for the shuttle to come back, just as we had 
many other times.  Reporter were standing around on this grassy area that used to be out there, 
the landing site’s changed a little bit since Columbia.  They’ve made a permanent viewing stand 
and sort of a more elaborate air traffic control tower than what they used to have, but reporters 
just stood around in small groups making conversation.  On the morning of the landing, it was 
like any other, we were waiting for the shuttle to come home and obviously that didn’t happen.  
Tragically enough.   
 
Following the moment where you knew something went wrong, what did you do for the rest of 
the day?  Did they take you somewhere else?  Were you trying to get information? 
 
Again, it was precisely the same procedure that it had always been, and keep in mind, even 
though there had been an accident, the accident didn’t happen at the Kennedy Space Center, it 
happened hundreds of mile west of the Kennedy Space Center in Texas and Louisiana.  
Everybody immediately went out and boarded the buses to go back to the press site, the way we 
always did after a successful landing.  And after it became clear that the shuttle wasn’t coming to 
land at the Kennedy Space Center we boarded the buses, went back to the Kennedy Space Center 
press site, where all of our permanent facilities and offices were located.  We had a double-wide 
trailer at the time I worked for the Orland Sentinel and I began typing stories for extra editions 
and the next day’s newspaper and barely budged from my seat from about 10AM that morning 
until about midnight that night.  It was a day I will never forget. 
 
I’m writing a lot about NASA’s crisis plan, about how they had a plan in place, was it obvious to 





It did and I guess one thing is should, in that context talk about, even though the ramp up to the 
accident was business as usual, when it became clear there was an accident NASA did have a 
crisis communication plan, in fact they have an overall contingency plan that goes above public 
affairs and covers other parts of the agency and how they respond to a disaster or accident.  I 
remember there was a press availability very briefly with the NASA Administrator who then was 
Sean O’Keefe that happened somewhere between and hour and two hours after the accident in 
which he came and made a brief statement.  Then not too much longer after that, I think I have 
the timing on this right, the Shuttle Program Manager Ron Dittemore had a press conference 
form the Johnson Space Center in Houston and reporters asked questions there.  Reporters who 
were around for the Challenger accident, and I was not as a journalist covering the space 
program at that time in 1986 when the Challenger accident occurred, colleagues of mine were 
reporters back then and were covering the space program and without a question everyone of 
them would say that NASA handled the aftermath of the Columbia accident far, far better than 
they handled the aftermath of the Challenger accident.  Some of the things that they did that 
made their handling so much better was the fact that they made information available in a more 
timely fashion and they made more of it available.  There were daily press conferences in the 
aftermath of the Columbia accident.  There was constant information releases.  There was a huge 
staff of public affairs officers who were available to help answer media questions.  The day after 
the accident occurred all of the people who cover the shuttle program essentially relocated to the 
Johnson Space Center in Houston, that was where the accident board was set up, the Columbia 
Accident Investigation Board had their headquarters, and it was also the home of the Johnson 
Space Center which of course is where the space program office, where the shuttle program 
manager works and its where the mission control center is where they were in charge of the re-
entry.  It’s where the mission management team was that oversaw the conduct of the mission and 
that sort of thing.  So that was sort of ground zero in the weeks and months after the accident.  I 
thought from a reporters standpoint, and again I’m not saying this because I now work for 
NASA, I thought all things considered they did an excellent job in trying to make things 
available in a timely fashion.  Again if you talk to people who covered both accidents I have 
never heard anybody say anything but that the handling of the Columbia accident by public 
affairs was dramatically better than handling of the Challenger accident when information was 
very difficult to come by. 
 
What was the relationship like between the media and NASA?  Was there ever a point where the 
relationship was difficult or strained?  Were there occasions where you couldn’t get information 
when you needed it? 
 
NASA is sort of interesting in that it has sort of a regular press corps that follows it.  There are 
maybe one to two dozen reporters who essentially are specialty or niche reporters covering 
NASA and the space program.  Some of them are even more niche than that and simply cover 
the space shuttle program.  That’s sort of important because NASA has ongoing relationships 
with these people and NASA knows them and they know the agency and there are people that 
they know and interact with on a regular basis.  I think familiarity helps with times like, in crisis 
communication situations because you know who you’re dealing with and you know what the 
expectations are and you know what that person’s looking for and you know where they’re 
coming from.  That’s not to say that there weren’t times when there were tense moments with 




there were tensions were people who sort of parachuted in, who covered other beats and general 
assignment reporters from other newspapers that didn’t usually cover the shuttle program who 
would drop in and be frustrated by their ability to break stories and get inside information, that 
sort of thing.  So were there tensions sometimes that would erupt between NASA public affairs 
and reporters?  Yes, there were but overall I don’t think it was that common and it was 
uncommon between NASA public affairs and this core group of beat reporters who routinely 
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